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Monſieur *Le Clerc's*

EXTRACT

AND

JUDGMENT

OF THE

Characteriſticks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times,

In Three Volumes.

Tranſlated from the *French* of the XIXth, XXIſt and XXIIId Tomes of the *Bibliotheque Choiſie.*

LONDON,

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INDEX

Of the ſeveral Treatiſes, of which an Account is given in this Extract.

TREATISE I.

A Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm: *tranſlated from* Bibl. Choiſie, Tom. XIX. *p.* 1.

TREATISE II.

Senſus Communis, *an Eſſay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, from the ſame Tome of* Bibl. Choiſ. *p.* 4.

TREATISE III.

Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author, from the XXIſt Tome of Bibl. Choiſ. *p.* 6.

TREATISE IV.

An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit: from the XXIIId Tome of Bibl. Choiſ. *p.* 19.

TREA-

TREATISE V.

The Moraliſts, a Philoſophical Rhapſody: from Bibl. Choiſ. Tom. XIX. *p.* 54.

TREATISE VI.

Miſcellaneous Reflections on the former Treatiſes, and other Critical Subjects: from Bibl. Choiſ. Tom. XXIII. *p.* 57.

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Mr. *Le Clerc*'s Rights of the Chriſtian Church adjuſted; being his Extract and Judgment of thoſe Authors who have written againſt *The Rights of the Chriſtian Church.* With his Opinion of Church-Diſcipline, and a Letter to Dr. *Hickes.*

——His Extract and Judgment of my Lord *Clarendon*'s Hiſtory, in two parts.

Both ſold by *E. Sanger.*

TREATISE I.

A

LETTER

CONCERNING

ENTHUSIASM,

TO

My Lord *****.



HO this Letter has already appear'd in *French*, ſome Months ago, and the Contents of it may have been ſeen, I ſhall however ſay ſomething of it; becauſe after I had read it again in *Engliſh*, I perceiv'd that in ſome places an ill Senſe might be given to it, which it had not, if narrowly look'd into. Not that it is ill tranſlated, but the Ear is not the ſame in all Languages; and what appears ſtrange to the *French* or *Dutch*, who do not

 underſtand

underſtand the *Engliſh* Language, nor are accuſtom'd to *Engliſh* Books, wou'd not ſeem ſo in the Original, which is very well writ.

Thoſe who have read it may have ſeen in general, that the Author does not therein propoſe to himſelf any certain Plan, to treat his Subject methodically; becauſe 'tis a Letter, and not a Treatiſe. But it ſhou'd be obſerv'd, that the Author, in writing to an *Engliſh* Lord, propoſes to deliver in an uncommon Style, ſeveral Things very uſeful, if rightly conſider'd. Men commonly treat of ſerious Things, ſuch as are, for example, Matters of Religion, with an Air, which does not ſhew a Mind ſufficiently calm, but an Imagination ſtruck with an unaccountable Fear, as if they ſpoke before a tyrannical Power; which, very far from being willing that the Truth ſhould be ſought for, lays Snares for humane Nature, to ſurpriſe it: ſo that if thro weakneſs, and ignorance, a Man does not ſpeak well, or is deceiv'd in the leaſt Point, it wou'd be angry at the poor Mortal, in a manner never to be pacify'd. This Fear produces a melancholy and gloomy *Enthuſiaſm*, which oppoſes all Examination and Inſight; as if Men were at a greater Certainty by examining nothing, and more pleaſing to God by virtue of this ſullen Humour, than if they remain'd in a calm and ſedate Diſpoſition, and rather inclin'd to Mirth than Melancholy. This *Enthuſiaſm* does yet more Miſchief; for it changes Men into ſavage Beaſts, and drives them on to perſecute their Fellow Creatures, if it happens that they are not entirely of their Sentiments.

The Author is not in the wrong for requiring them to be in a more gay and calm Situation of Mind: he muſt not be underſtood to mean the Jollity of Epicures or Pot-Companions;

nions; but the interior Joy, which proceeds from the Love of Truth, and from a Man's conſciouſneſs that he do's his Endeavors to find it, and that he follows it, as much as humane Frailty permits.

He ſhews throughout the whole Book, that, in every thing we do, there is mix'd a certain *Enthuſiaſm*, which encreaſes the Paſſion that poſſeſſes us, and changes the Face of the Objects that ſurround us, or are preſented to our Mind.

It ſeems, he calls all the extraordinary Motions of the Imagination *Enthuſiaſm*; whether they be founded upon Reaſon, or no. When they are guided by good Senſe, they are not uſeleſs to lead Men to Virtue; but when they hurry away Reaſon, they are very prejudicial. From thence proceed the moſt cruel and moſt unnatural Perſecutions. From thence proceeds that fretful and haſty Manner, which ſuffers not the leaſt Ridicule againſt what we have once imbraced, on what Foundation ſoever, and which had rather be perſecuted than laugh'd at. Nevertheleſs it is certain, that Truth and good Senſe are proof againſt all Ridicule; which thoſe who are convinc'd of any thing by the Light of Reaſon, eaſily laugh at. But if it happens that what we maintain is falſe, it is certain, that to turn it into Ridicule, is to deſtroy it without Remedy. There is not, in the leaſt, any need of Perſecution, to deſtroy falſe Sentiments; only deliver them over to Ridicule, and they will be contemn'd for ever. On the contrary, Truth has no need to fear Ridicule, which it can ſedately repulſe, by the moſt pure Lights of Good Senſe. If the Tenets of Morality, which Mr. *Paſcal* has attack'd in his *Provincial Letters*, had been true, he wou'd have been himſelf laugh'd at, and have gain'd no-

thing but Contempt; but as they were falſe, the Author of the *Provincial Letters* has done them more hurt by ridiculing them, than the ſtrongeſt Arguments wou'd have done.

I cannot dwell any longer on the Subject of this Book, which being well underſtood may be of great Uſe. I do not know the Author of it; but whoſoever he is, he is a Man of Wit, an entire Maſter of his Subject, and writes in *Engliſh* with a great deal of Delicacy and Vivacity. The Book deſerves to be read with Attention, that he may not be charg'd with a Meaning or Deſign which he has not.

TREATISE II.

Senſus Communis: *An Eſſay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour, in a Letter to a Friend.*

THIS Book is perfectly well writ in *Engliſh*, and the Author therein attacks the Sceptics, who were attack'd in the preceding Book. The Original *Engliſh* is not divided into Parts, but the *French* Tranſlator has divided it into four Parts; and indeed this ſerves for the better following the Thoughts of the Author.

In the firſt, he ſhews that a Man ought not to be angry that the Sceptics call in queſtion all

all Tenets, since they are ignorant of the true Foundations of them; nor even that they put them to the tryal of Raillery. But after he has let them laugh their fill, he laughs too, at their Expence; and I think 'tis the greatest Vengeance that Truth can take of Error, and that it is infinitely more worthy of it, than Wrath and Passion. In the second Part, he takes to task the Sentiments of *Hobbes* touching the Principles of Society, which he establishes only upon Fear and Interest, without acknowledging in Men any natural Love that they have for one another. The Author shews the contrary, and proves that neither *Hobbes*, nor his Followers are able to dispossess themselves of the Affections of Nature. In the third, he shews that the natural State of Men, in which *Hobbes* describes them like wild Beasts, is chimerical. They naturally indeed love themselves; but this Love cannot be satisfy'd without Society, and the Enjoyment of those Sweets, which are found therein, by practising the Rules of the exactest Virtue. Lastly, he shews that Virtue hath naturally Beauties which all the World is charm'd with.

I can say no more of it: and it is better to refer the Readers to the Original *English*, if they understand it; or at least to the *French* Version, which is faithful and exact, as much as the Difference of the Languages wou'd permit.

In the preceding Tracts, as well as in *the Moralists*, of which I shall speak in its proper Place, there is a *Je-ne-sçay-quoy* of Original, of Easiness, and of Freedom, which will please so much the more as one penetrates the bottom of the Subjects, and enters into the Mind and Manner of the Author.

TREATISE III.

Soliloquy: *Or Advice to an Author.*

THIS little Book is full of excellent Advice, which the Author gives to thoſe who apply themſelves to writing, and likewiſe to thoſe who profit by ſuch Writers Performances, and have it in their power to befriend them. The turn of the Whole is ſingular, and the Style full of Spirit and Wit. The Morality is nice and curious; and 'tis evident that the Author who adviſes others to *Soliloquy*, is accuſtom'd to meditate or converſe with himſelf. His whole Work ſhews that he has throly ſtudy'd the Heart of Man. 'Tis divided into three Parts, and each Part into ſome Sections. We ſhall follow them as much as poſſible: for if all that deſerves to be read were to be put down in this Place, the Book muſt be tranſcrib'd from one End to t'other.

I. 1. The Author begins with examining the common ſaying, that *no one was ever the better for Advice.* He thinks this may proceed from the Manner in which it is generally given: for by what he could obſerve in many Occurrences of Life, *to give Advice* was properly taking an occaſion to ſhew our own Wiſdom at another's expence; and *to receive it*, was little better than tamely to afford another the occaſion of raiſing himſelf a Character from our Defects. There

is

is I know not what Intereſtedneſs in *giving Advice*, which prevents it from being a free Gift. For to make a Gift free, there muſt be nothing in it which takes from another, or adds to our ſelf; which is not the Caſe here, where by reprehending another, we ſeem to be wiſer or more able than he. In all other Reſpects, to *give* and to *diſpenſe*, is Generoſity and Good-will: but to beſtow Wiſdom, is to gain a Maſtery which can't ſo eaſily be allow'd us. Men willingly learn whatever elſe is taught them. They can bear a Maſter in Mathematics, in Muſic, or in any other Science; but not in Underſtanding and Good Senſe: it is more eſpecially difficult for an Author not to appear aſſuming in this Reſpect.

Our Author however is of Opinion that there is a certain Knack, or Legerdemain in Argument, by which we may ſafely proceed to the dangerous Part of *adviſing*, and make ſure of the good Fortune to have our Advice accepted, if it be any thing worth. He propoſes, as it were, to conſider of this Buſineſs as a Caſe of Surgery. A Tenderneſs of Hand is principally requiſite in this ſort of Surgery. The Perſon likewiſe on whom the Operation is to be made, muſt have Patience to ſuffer it.

Theſe two Things may be found in one and the ſame Perſon who ſtudies *Himſelf*, and is capable of ſeeing and reproving his own Faults. 'Twou'd not be amiſs, according to our Author, for a Man to retire into ſome thick Wood or Deſert, and there to converſe with himſelf with a loud Voice, and to take his own Faults to task, as he wou'd another's. Inſtead of this, Men mind nothing but the Faults of others, and ſo nothing is amended.

Thoſe

Thoſe who publiſh *Memoirs* and *Eſſays*, inſtead of thus converſing with themſelves, entertain the World with the good Qualities they fancy they are endu'd with, or the gallant Actions they pretend to have done. Theſe they ought to have kept to themſelves. "Who can "endure, as our Author ſays very well, to "hear an Empirick talk of his own Conſtitu- "tion, how he governs and manages it, what "Diet agrees beſt with it, and what his Prac- "tice is with himſelf?"

Others publiſh *Meditations*, *Occaſional Reflections*, *Solitary Thoughts*, and the like. The beſt Title our Author can conceive for ſuch Works, wou'd be that, which another certain Author gives them, who call'd them his *Crudities*. Many of theſe Gentlemen make profeſſion of an extraordinary Devotion, which ſours their Humour, and prevents their examining any other Faults in their Neighbour than thoſe which they call *Sins*: tho a Sinner againſt good Breeding and the Laws of Decency will no more be look'd on as a good Author, than a Sinner againſt Grammar, good Argument, or good Senſe. And if Moderation and Temper are not of a Party with the Writer, let his Cauſe be ever ſo good, 'tis queſtion'd whether he will be able to recommend it with great advantage to the World.

This Exerciſe therefore of Self-Converſe is not very proper for theſe ſort of Men, eſpecially if they ſpeak often in Public, in a Place where they are not contradicted. There is danger leſt ſuch Men thro this Habit ſhou'd ſuffer much by Crudities, Indigeſtions, Choler, Bile, and particularly by a certain Tumor or Flatulency, which renders them unable to apply the wholeſom *Regimen* of Self-practice. A great

Inſtance

Inſtance of the want of this Sovereign Remedy may be drawn from our common great Talkers, who ingroſs the greateſt Part of the Converſation of the World, and are the forwardeſt to ſpeak in public Aſſemblies, but have never been any Talkers by themſelves, nor us'd to theſe private Diſcuſſions of our Home *Regimen.*

2. If, as ſome of the Antients believ'd, and ſome of the Moderns likewiſe, we had a good Genius or a good Angel who knew us throly, with whom we might entertain our ſelves, he might inform us of all our Faults. But for want of ſuch Entertainments, we ought, as it were by virtue of an intimate Receſs, to divide our ſelves into two Parties, one to be inveſted with the Character of a Cenſor, and the other of the Cenſured. The Author ſays a great many very pretty things upon this Subject; and ſhews, by a kind of Parable, that there are actually at certain Times in one ſingle Man, two different Perſons, one whereof is inclin'd to Virtue, and the other to Vice. The former is inlighten'd by *Reaſon*, and the other led by ‖ *Paſſion*, which the Author very ingeniouſly calls *Reaſon's eldeſt Siſter.*

‖ *It is* Appetite *in the Engliſh, but this is what we call* Paſſion *in French.*

3. For a Man to arrive at a Capacity of perfectly diſtinguiſhing himſelf from himſelf, the Author makes appear that the Study of Moral Philoſophy is abſolutely neceſſary. Great Advantage may be had by the reading of the antient *Mimes*, which were ingenious Imitations of humane Life, as is ſeen in thoſe Comedies that are well written: as likewiſe by the reading of Heroic Poems, ſuch as *Homer*, and the antient Authors of Dialogues, ſuch as *Plato*, for whom our Author diſcovers a particular Eſteem.

The reading of ſuch ſort of Books is ſo much the more uſeful, as that thoſe who writ them, preſent the Reader with quite another thing than themſelves, and ſet before him Characters of different Perſons, of whom he may make infinite Advantage. Inſtead of this there are a great many Authors, who ſtudy nothing but to humour their Readers, and to gain their Favour. " This, ſays he, is the Coquetry of a modern " Author, whoſe *Epiſtles Dedicatory*, *Prefaces*, " and *Addreſſes* to the Reader are ſo many af- " fected Graces deſign'd to draw his Attention " from the Subject towards himſelf, and make " it be generally obſerv'd, not ſo much *what he* " *ſays* as *what he appears*, or *is*, and what Figure " he already makes, or hopes to make in the " faſhionable World. Theſe are the Airs which " a neighbouring Nation give themſelves, " more particularly in what they call their *Me-* " *moires*. Their very *Eſſasy* and *Politics*, their " *Philoſophical* and *Critical* Works, their *Com-* " *ments* upon antient and modern Authors, all " their Treatiſes are *Memoires*; or Works to " attract to themſelves the Eſteem of the Read- " er, as much at leaſt as to inſtruct him in the " Things they treat of."

II. 1. After having diſcover'd the Advantage that an Author may derive, as well as other Men, from the Converſation he may have with himſelf, he ſpeaks of the Aſſiſtance and Help he may have from abroad, either from the Converſation of the Men in Power, or the Learned, or the Populace themſelves.

He obſerves very well here, that it wou'd be a hard Caſe, ſhou'd the Princes of the *Engliſh* Nation refuſe to countenance the induſtrious Race of Authors; ſince their Royal Anceſtors and Predeceſſors have had ſuch Honour deriv'd

to

to them from this Profeſſion. 'Tis to this they owe that bright Jewel of their Crown purchas'd by a warlike Prince; who having aſſum'd the *Author*, and eſſay'd his Strength in the Polemic Writings of the School Divines, thought it an Honour on this Account to retain the Title of *Defender of the Faith*. Another Prince of a more pacific Nature and fluent Thought, ſubmitting Arms and martial Diſcipline to the Gown, and confiding in his princely Science and profound Learning, made his Stile and Speech the Nerve and Sinew of his Government. He gave us his Works full of wiſe Exhortation and Advice to his Royal Son, as well as of Inſtruction to his good People; who cou'd not but admire their *Author*-Sovereign, thus ſtudious and contemplative in their behalf. 'Twas then one might have ſeen our Nation growing young and docile, with that Simplicity of Heart, which qualify'd them to profit like a *Scholar*-People under their Royal Preceptor. For with abundant Eloquence he graciouſly gave Leſſons to his Parliament, tutor'd his Miniſters, and edify'd the greateſt Churchmen and Divines themſelves; by whoſe Suffrage he obtain'd the higheſt Appellations that could be merited by the acuteſt Wit and trueſt Underſtanding. From hence the *Britiſh* Nations were taught to own in common a *Solomon* for their Joint-Sovereign, the Founder of their late compleated Union. Nor can it be doubted that the pious Treatiſe of * *Self-Diſcourſe* aſcrib'd to the ſucceeding Monarch, contributed in a great meaſure to his glorious and never-failing Titles of SAINT and MARTYR.

* Eicon Baſilike, *which he compos'd, as ſome have thought, during his Impriſonment.* See Bibl. Ch. Tom. XV. p. 106.

It is afterwards made appear that the Princes and Grandees of that fortunate Island, if they know their own good Fortune, have all the Reason in the World to favour Men of Letters, upon account of the Advantage which the Public receives from their Labours, and the Glory that accrues to themselves. The *British* Nation, and likewise their Neighbours, will not fail to wish this Passage may produce the Effect for which it was written; and if the Grandees of that Country wou'd espouse such Men whose Works and Reputation are Securities for the Knowledg they profess, they wou'd certainly acquire universal Applause from all who have any Tast, and would draw forth a thousand fine Productions either from the Wit or Cabinets of the Learned, who otherwise may lose their Inclination to Industry, or suppress their Performances after they are compleated.

2. The Author afterwards shews the Usefulness of Wise and Reasonable Critics to Authors. Indeed, without the Critics, no Work can be perfected; and Men fall into so great an Indifference towards Authors, that they rather chuse to have their Works unjustly criticiz'd, than not read.

In this Section the Reader will find a rational History of the antient *Greek* Authors, and afterwards of the *English*. Tho he sticks to general Terms, yet he points out very well the Beginning, Progress and Perfection of Eloquence in Verse and Prose, among the *Greeks*, and likewise of Philosophy. It will be here seen that it was not Chance, but the very Nature of Things, which gave Rise, Growth and Maturity to the Fruits of the *Grecian* Wit. It is likewise here observ'd, that good Critics have occasion'd the Advancement of Sciences, by remarking upon the

the Faults of ſuch Pieces which have been publiſh'd in that Nation. Tho he does not call the Authors by their Names, they who are ever ſo little converſant in the learned Hiſtory of the Antients, will eaſily diſcern who the Author means. The *Engliſh* Poets indeed are not ſo well known to us, becauſe few Men on this ſide the Sea underſtand *Engliſh* well enough to read thoſe Poets. There will likewiſe be found throughout, very good Leſſons for ſuch as now apply themſelves to Writing. Our Author has this in particular, that he oftentimes inſtructs his Reader in thoſe Places where he ſeems to make Digreſſions. He has likewiſe the Art of abounding more in Senſe than Words.

3. He afterwards obſerves, that the *Satyrs* and *Panegyrics* of the Moderns, eſpecially in *England*, are far inferior to thoſe of the Antients. *Engliſh* Satyrs are ſcurrilous, and reſemble the antient Comedy of the *Greeks*, which was full of Gall and Abuſes; and the *Panegyrics* are perfectly fulſom and inſipid. But as for this latter, there is a certain neighbouring Nation who are not behind them in this reſpect, and who praiſe every thing when they undertake to do it, with ſuch an Exceſs, as is inſupportable among People that are not us'd to ſuch ſort of Civility. Our Author is of Opinion that the *Engliſh* Writers have no want of Wit or Fancy, but of Judgment and Correctneſs; which can only be attain'd by thorow Diligence, Study, and impartial Cenſure of themſelves. They are likewiſe wanting in the knowledg of Manners, which they muſt neceſſarily borrow from the Philoſophers. The Poet muſt at leaſt be ſpecioufly honeſt, and in all appearance a Friend to Virtue, throughout his Poem. The Good and Wiſe will abate him nothing

thing in this kind. And the People, tho corrupt, are, in the main, beſt ſatisfy'd with this Conduct.

III. 1. The firſt Section of the Third Part is full of excellent Leſſons concerning the Cuſtom ſome Men have of flattering Authors, and the manner of ſtudying Morals. Such a one tells an Author, that he has ſurpaſs'd himſelf, and 'tis ſuppos'd by that he has always done well; whereas he often ſurpaſſes himſelf as much in Dulneſs as in Wit. Some Men ſtudy the Manners phyſically, and think they know them, when they are acquainted with the Alterations which *Des Cartes* fancy'd were made in our Bodies, at the time when the Paſſions (which he enumerates) poſſeſs us. Our Author is in the right to think, that they who underſtand Morality no otherwiſe than thus, don't underſtand it at all. He likewiſe makes other judicious Remarks concerning the Unprofitableneſs of ſeveral ſorts of Study.

2. In the ſecond Section he gives Examples how an Author may examine himſelf, by the means of *Soliloquy*. Theſe Diſcourſes are very ingenious, and may be beneficial to a great many others beſides Authors. He ſhews, in ſeveral Places, that there is nothing ſo common, as to ſuffer one's ſelf to be govern'd by Opinion or Fancy. He ſays in one place, that if ſuch as have made uſe of, or profited by the Converſe they have had with Men of Underſtanding, would but ask themſelves what it is they are guided by, they will undoubtedly anſwer *their Intereſt*. "But what is *Intereſt?* And "how govern'd? (*They would anſwer readily*) "By Opinion and Fancy. Is every thing there- "fore my Intereſt which I fancy ſuch? Or may "my Fancy poſſibly be wrong? Undoubted-

"ly

" ly it may. If my Fancy of Intereſt there-
" fore be wrong, can my Purſuit or Aim be
" right? Hardly ſo. Can I then be ſuppos'd
" to *hit*, when I know not, in reality, ſo
" much as how to aim?

" My chief Intereſt, it ſeems therefore,
" muſt be to get *an Aim*, and know certainly
" where my Happineſs and Advantage lies.
" Where can it lie but with my Pleaſure?
" ſince my Advantage and Good can never but
" be pleaſing; and what is pleaſing, can ne-
" ver be other than my Advantage and Good?
" Excellent! Let *Fancy* therefore govern, and
" *Intereſt* be what we pleaſe. For if that
" which pleaſes us be our Good, becauſe it
" pleaſes us; any thing may be our INTE-
" REST or GOOD. That which we fondly
" make our Happineſs at one time, we may
" as readily unmake again at another. No one
" can learn what *real* GOOD is, nor can any
" one upon this foot be ſaid to underſtand
" his INTEREST.

" Here, we ſee, are ſtrange Embroils! But
" let us deal more candidly with our ſelves, and
" frankly own that Pleaſure is no Rule of
" Good; ſince when we follow Pleaſure mere-
" ly, we are diſguſted, and change from one
" ſort to another; condemning that at one
" time, which at another we earneſtly ap-
" prove, and never judging equally of Happi-
" neſs, whilſt we follow Paſſion and mere Hu-
" mour, *&c.*

" How can I then controul my Fancy, and
" fix it, if poſſible, on ſomething which may
" hold good? When I exerciſe my Reaſon on
" moral Subjects; when I imploy my Affections
" in friendly and ſocial Actions, I find I can at
" that time enjoy my ſelf with a great deal of

Satisfac-

" Satisfaction. If there be a Pleaſure therefore
" of this kind, why do I not indulge it? Or
" what harm would there be, ſuppoſing it
" ſhould grow greater by Indulgence? If I am
" lazy, and indulge my ſelf in the languid
" Pleaſure, I know the Harm, and can foreſee
" the Drone. If I am luxurious, I know the
" Harm of this alſo, and have the plain Proſ-
" pect of the Sot. If Avarice be my Pleaſure,
" the End, I know, is being a Miſer. But if
" HONESTY be my Delight, I know no other
" Conſequence from indulging ſuch a Paſſion,
" than that of growing better-natur'd, and
" enjoying more and more the Pleaſures of
" Society. On the other hand, if this honeſt
" Pleaſure be loſt, by knaviſh Indulgence and
" Immorality, there can hardly be a Satisfac-
" tion left of any kind; ſince good Nature and
" ſocial Affection is ſo eſſential, even to the
" Pleaſures of a Debauch.

" If therefore the only Pleaſure I can freely
" and without Reſerve indulge, be that of the
" honeſt and moral kind; if the rational and
" ſocial Enjoyment be ſo conſtant in it ſelf,
" and ſo eſſential to Happineſs; why ſhould I
" not bring my other Pleaſures to correſpond
" and be Friends with it, rather than raiſe
" other Pleaſures, which are deſtructive of
" this Foundation?

" Upon this bottom let me try how I can
" bear the Aſſault of Fancy, and maintain my
" ſelf in my moral Fortreſs, which is rais'd
" on the ſide of corrupt Intereſt, and a wrong
" *Self-Love*. When the Idea of Pleaſure, in-
" compatible with the State I have deſcrib'd,
" ſtrikes, I ask my ſelf; Before I was thus
" ſtruck by the Idea, was any thing amiſs with
" me? Nothing. Therefore remove this Idea,

" and

" and I am as well as before. But having this " Idea, ſuch as I now have, I cannot want the " thing, without regret. See, therefore, " which is beſt: either to ſuffer under this " Want, till the Idea be remov'd; or by ſatiſ- " fying the Want, to confirm not only this Idea, " but all others of the ſame ſtamp."

There are, in this Section, other Soliloquies, as well turn'd as theſe are; which will be found in the Original, the whole Energy whereof is very difficult to be explain'd in *French*. He very properly applies to this Subject of Soliloquy, theſe Verſes of *Horace*, which the Author ſeems to be perfect Maſter of.

——*Neque enim, cum lectulus, aut* ME *Porticus excepit, deſum* MIHI: " *Rectius hoc eſt:* " *Hoc faciens, vivam melius: ſic dulcis amicis* " *Occurram.*"——*Hæc* EGO ME CUM *Compreſſis agito labris.*——

Hor. Sat. 4. lib. 1.

'Tis indeed a very good *Soliloquy*, which our Critics, who read *Horace*, and juſtly admire him, ought to profit by more than they do.

3. The Author concludes by very judicious Remarks upon the bad and good Taſt, which is form'd, as he with reaſon believes, by the reading of Books: " We are the unhappier in " this reſpect, *ſays he*, for being Scholars; if " our Studies be ill choſen. Nor can I, for " this reaſon, think it proper to call a Man " *well-read*, only becauſe he has read *many Au-* " *thors*; ſince he muſt of neceſſity have ſeen " more ill Models than good, and be more " ſtuff'd with Bombaſt, ill Fancy, and wry " Thought, than fill'd with ſolid Senſe, and " juſt Imagination."

I cannot relate any more of it, only that the Author concludes, by saying, that to preſerve the Privilege of a *Giver of Advice*, a Man muſt firſt receive it himſelf with ſubmiſſion, where the Authority of the Public is concern'd; and that, Secondly, he muſt have Reſolution enough to criticize himſelf, according to the manner of the Soliloquies which he preſcrib'd. "As we grow wiſer, *ſays he*, we ſhall "prove leſs conceited, and introduce into our "Character that Modeſty, Condeſcenſion and "juſt Humanity, which is eſſential to the Suc-"ceſs of all friendly Counſel and Admonition. "An honeſt Home-Philoſophy muſt teach us "the wholeſome Practice within our ſelves. "After which, polite Reading, and Converſe "with Mankind of the better ſort, will quali-"fy us for what remains."

All Men of Senſe will voluntarily ſubſcribe to theſe Truths; but there will ever be found Pedants, whoſe Hearts being full of Pride and Blindneſs, will hinder them from profiting either by their Reading, or Converſe with the World. Theſe People, whoſe haughty and brutiſh Manners do not ſuffer us to imagine that they ſo much as ſuſpect themſelves capable of being deceiv'd, ought to be treated with Contempt by thoſe who underſtand themſelves.

TREA-

TREATISE IV.

An Inquiry concerning VIRTUE, *or* MERIT.

THE firſt Treatiſe of the ſecond Volume, of the new Edition, which is an *Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit*, is as ſolid in its Matter, as regular in its Method, and as well handled as any Treatiſe of Morality I ever read in my Life; and, ſince the Subject deſerves it, I ſhall expatiate a little more at large upon it.

The Author propoſes to inquire concerning two Things of very great Importance. The firſt, *What Virtue is, conſider'd in it ſelf; What Influence Religion has upon it; How it includes it; and Whether it be a true ſaying, "That it is impoſſible "for an Atheiſt to be Virtuous, or ſhare any real "degree of Honeſty, or Merit"*. The ſecond, *What Obligation Men have to be Virtuous; and what Reaſon to imbrace it.* Theſe are the two Queſtions which the Author treats of, in theſe two Books.

The Religious part of Mankind have been ſo much alarm'd by the Freedom of ſome late Pens, that whatever an Author may ſuggeſt in favour of Religion, he will gain little Credit in the Cauſe, if he allows the leaſt advantage to any other Principle. On the other ſide, they who entertain themſelves in expoſing the weak

ſides of Religion, are ſo deſperately afraid of being drawn into any ſerious Thoughts of it, that they look upon a Man as guilty of foul Play, who aſſumes the Air of a *Free Writer*, and at the ſame time preſerves any regard for the Principles of Natural Religion. They are apt to give as little Quarter as they receive; and are reſoly'd to think as ill of the Morals of their Antagoniſts, as their Antagoniſts can poſſibly think of theirs. Neither of 'em will allow the leaſt Advantage to the other. 'Tis as hard to perſuade one ſort, that there is any Virtue in Religion, as the other, that there is any Virtue out of the Verge of their particular Community. So that an Author will have an ill time of it, who dares plead for *Religion* and *Moral Virtue*, without leſſening the force of one or t'other; and who wou'd, without altering the Boundaries of either, reconcile them to each other.

This Difficulty, however, did not hinder the Author from applying himſelf to his *Inquiry*; and we muſt give him this Commendation, That there do's not appear, either in his Sentiments, or in the Turn he gives to them, any of that Paſſion or Gall, which commonly predominates in ſuch Diſputes. He, every where, preſerves the Character of a Man who loves Truth, without being angry with any body; he, all along, proceeds with that calm Good Humour, which he recommends with ſo much Reaſon, in his *Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm*, and in his *Eſſay upon Wit and Humour*.

The Truth which he finds in Religion do's not make him Inhumane, or Sullen; and he confutes thoſe who reject it, with a ſedate Confidence, which is not mix'd with any Rancor againſt ſuch as are of a different Opinion. His

Arguments

Arguments ought to be heard with the ſame Temper.

I. 1. In the Univerſe, either all is according to Good Order, and conſpires to the ſame End, *viz.* the Intereſt of the Whole; or there is ſomething that does otherwiſe, and might poſſibly have been better conſtituted, or more wiſely contriv'd for that General End. Book I. Part 1.

If the firſt Propoſition be admitted; then there is no ſuch thing as real *Ill*, or nothing *Ill* with reſpect to the Whole. Whatſoever, then, is ſo as that it cou'd not really have been better order'd, is perfectly Good; and whatſoever is *Ill*, is what might have been better.

Whatſoever is really *Ill*, therefore, muſt be produc'd, either by Deſign (that is to ſay with Knowledg and Intelligence) or by Hazard and mere Chance. If there be any thing *Ill* in the Univerſe from Deſign, then that which diſpoſes all Things, is no one good deſigning Principle; or there is ſome other Being which operates contrarily, and is *Ill*.

On the contrary, if there be any *Ill* in the Univerſe from mere *Chance*; then a deſigning Principle or Mind, whether Good or Bad, cannot be the Cauſe of all Things. And conſequently if there be ſuppos'd a deſigning Principle who is the Cauſe only of Good, but cannot prevent the *Ill* which happens from Chance, or from a contrary ill Deſign; then there can be ſuppos'd in reality no ſuch thing as a Superior good Deſign or Mind, other than what is impotent and defective.

Whatſoever is Superior in any degree over the World, or rules in Nature with Diſcernment and Mind, is what by univerſal Agreement Men call GOD. If there are ſeveral ſuch Superior Minds, they are ſo many *Gods*; but if

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that ſingle, or thoſe ſeveral Superiors are not in their Nature neceſſarily Good, they rather take the Name of *Dæmon*.

To believe therefore that every thing is govern'd or order'd for the *beſt* by a deſigning Principle or Mind, neceſſarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect * THEIST, that is to ſay, to be perſuaded there is a God. To believe that every thing is govern'd by Chance, without any regard to the common Intereſt of the Whole, or of any Particulars, is to be a perfect Atheiſt. To believe no one Supreme deſigning Principle or Mind, but rather two, three or more, is to be a POLYTHEIST: To believe the governing Mind or Minds not abſolutely or neceſſarily good, nor confin'd to what is beſt, but capable of acting according to mere Will or Fancy, is to be a DÆMONIST.

There are few who think always conſiſtently, or according to one certain Hypotheſis, upon any Subject ſo abſtruſe and intricate as *the Cauſe* of all things, and the Oeconomy or Government of the Univerſe. The moſt devout People ſtand ſometimes in need of their Faith, to ſupport them in the Belief of a Supreme Wiſdom, and are tempted to judg diſadvantageouſly of a Providence and juſt Adminiſtration in the Whole. That alone, therefore, is to be call'd a Man's Opinion, which is of any other the moſt habitual to him, and occurs upon moſt Occaſions. So that 'tis hard certainly to pronounce of any Man, he is an *Atheiſt*; becauſe unleſs his whole Thoughts are at all Seaſons, and on all Occaſions, ſteddily bent againſt all Suppoſition or Imagination of Deſign in Things, he is no per-

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* *Care muſt be taken not to confound this Word with that of* Deiſt.

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fect *Atheiſt*. We ſhou'd reaſon in the ſame manner upon *Theiſm* and *Dæmoniſm*, whereof there are different Kinds, of which the Author makes an exact Enumeration; but I ſhall not dwell upon them.

Since there are ſeveral Opinions concerning a Superior Power; and ſince there may be found Perſons who doubt, either thro Scepticiſm, Negligence of Thought, or Confuſion of Judgment; the Conſideration is, how theſe Opinions may be conſiſtent with Virtue, or an Honeſt or Moral Character.

2. We know that every intelligent Creature has a private Good and Intereſt of his own, which Nature compels him to ſeek with his beſt Endeavors, according to the Compaſs of his Make. We know, likewiſe, that there is in Reality a right and a wrong State of every Creature; and that his right-one is by Nature forwarded, and by himſelf affectionately ſought. Since therefore there is in every Creature a certain Intereſt or Good, there muſt be alſo a certain *End*, to which every thing in his Conſtitution muſt naturally refer. If there be any thing either in his Appetites, Paſſions or Affections, that does not conduce to this End, but is contrary to it; we muſt of neceſſity own it *Ill* to him. In this manner he is *Ill* with reſpect to himſelf; as he certainly is with reſpect to others of his Kind, when any ſuch Appetites or Paſſions make him any way injurious to them. Now if, by the natural Conſtitution of any rational Creature, the ſame Irregularities of Appetite which make him ill to others, make him ill alſo to himſelf; and if the ſame Regularity of Affections which cauſes him to be good in one Senſe, cauſes him to be good alſo in the other; then is that Goodneſs by

Book I. Part 2.

which

which he is thus uſeful to others, a real Good and Advantage to himſelf: and thus *Virtue* and *Intereſt* may be found at laſt to agree. Only we muſt take care to diſtinguiſh the true Intereſt of every one, from what is only ſo in Appearance.

This is what will be ſhewn in the latter Part of the Inquiry; the Author's firſt deſign being to determine clearly what that Quality is to which we give the Name of *Goodneſs*, or *Virtue*.

If ſome Hiſtorian or Traveller ſhou'd tell us that there is a certain Creature that had neither Mate, nor Fellow of any kind, nothing of his own Likeneſs, and towards which he had any Inclination; that he liv'd in a perfect State of Solitude; that in ſhort there was nothing without or beyond himſelf, for which he had the leaſt Paſſion or Concern: we might be apt to ſay, perhaps, without much Heſitation, that this was doubtleſs a very melancholy Creature, and muſt needs have a very diſconſolate kind of Life.

But if we were aſſur'd, notwithſtanding all this, that the Creature enjoy'd himſelf with a great deal of Pleaſure, had a perfect Reliſh of his way of Living, and was in nothing wanting of his own Good; we might perhaps acknowledg that the Creature was no Monſter, nor abſurdly conſtituted as to himſelf; but we ſhou'd hardly ſay of him that he was a *good* Creature. However, ſhou'd it be urg'd againſt us, that be he what he wou'd, the Creature was ſtill perfect in himſelf, and therefore to be eſteem'd good; for what had he to do with others? In this ſenſe indeed we might be forc'd to acknowledg, that he was a *good* Creature; if he cou'd be underſtood to be abſolute and compleat in himſelf,

himſelf, without any real Relation to any thing in the Univerſe beſides. For if it ſhou'd be ſuppos'd or found that there were any where in Nature a Species of Creatures, of which he was to be conſider'd as a Part, then cou'd he by no means be allow'd *good*; whilſt he plainly appear'd to be ſuch a Part, as made rather to the Harm than Good of that Syſtem or Whole in which he was included.

We ought to make the ſame Judgment of the Conſtitution of every Animal which has Relation to ſome other Creature. We muſt undoubtedly conſider him, as a Part of the Whole to which he refers. Thus the Male and Female having Relation to each other, ought to be conſider'd not abſolutely, but relatively to that Tye, and even to the Exiſtence of thoſe Beings which are produc'd from their Conjunction. There are likewiſe Creatures whoſe Deſtruction ſerves for the Preſervation of another Species. And therefore we cannot ſay that any thing is abſolutely *ill*, unleſs it is apparently hurtful to its own Species, and to others, without being ſerviceable to any thing.

We do not, however, ſay that ſuch a one is an *ill Man* becauſe he has the Plague; or becauſe when he is in a convulſive Fit and not Maſter of himſelf, he ſtrikes and wounds ſuch as approach him. Nor do we ſay, on the other ſide, that he is a *good Man*, when, having his Hands ty'd up, he is hinder'd from doing the Miſchief he deſigns; or (which is the ſame thing) when he abſtains from doing Miſchief for fear of Puniſhment, or thro the Allurement of ſome expected Pleaſure or Advantage, which is not neceſſarily join'd with good Affection.

Since it is therefore by Affection merely, that a Creature is eſteem'd good or ill, *natural* or

unnatural; our buſineſs will be, to examine which are the *good* and *natural*, and which the *ill* and *unnatural* Affections.

In the firſt Place then it may be obſerv'd, that if there be an Affection towards any Subject conſider'd as private Good, which is not really ſuch, nor any way eſſential to the Intereſt or Happineſs of the Creature; this Affection, as being ſuperfluous, and detracting from the Force of other requiſite and good Affections, is itſelf vicious and ill.

In the ſecond Place, they who love themſelves ſo much as to prefer their private Good to that of the Publick, are of a vicious Diſpoſition, and this is commonly call'd *Selfiſhneſs*. On the contrary, if a Man does not love himſelf any otherwiſe than is conſiſtent with the Publick Good, and at the ſame time advantageous to himſelf; this ſort of Self-Love is not blameable in any Senſe. A Man may love himſelf, and yet be well affected towards the Good of the whole Species, as the Author makes appear. He adds other Remarks very worthy to be read, but which I cannot ſet down without tranſlating his whole Book.

This ſingle Inclination of doing good to the Species, which is call'd *Gentleneſs* and *Goodneſs*, and which is viſible in the Beaſts themſelves, is not however what we call *Virtue* or *Merit*. Beſides this, in a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, the Affections of Pity, Kindneſs, Gratitude, and their Contraries, become Objects by Reflection; the firſt are belov'd, and the laſt hated. As there are in natural Bodies, Beauties which pleaſe us, and Deformities which offend us: So likewiſe in moral Things, there are Objects worthy of our Love, and others of our Averſion. Thus *publick*

Good

Good is an Object which the Mind forms to itſelf, and in which it neceſſarily takes a Part if it is well diſpos'd: On the contrary, *public Hurt* is ſomething which it ſtarts at, and of which he wou'd not willingly be the Cauſe, unleſs it be of a very ill Diſpoſition. It is properly in this reflex and mental Love of *Good* conſider'd in general, and in the reflex and mental hatred of *Evil*, that what we call Virtue does conſiſt, as the Author demonſtrates more at large.

From hence ariſes likewiſe a Knowledg of what is juſt or unjuſt, whereby we may know whether we are right or wrong; but I cannot dwell upon it, any more than upon what the Author ſays concerning the Degrees of Virtue.

3. It conſiſts *in a certain juſt Diſpoſition, or proportionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the Moral Objects of Right and Wrong.* Book I. Part 3. Nothing therefore can deſtroy it, but either what takes away from Man the natural Senſe of Right and Wrong, or what creates a wrong Senſe of it, or what cauſes the right Senſe to be oppos'd by *contrary* Affections. On the other ſide, nothing can aſſiſt or advance the Principle of Virtue, but what either in ſome manner preſerves in Man a Senſe of Right and Wrong, or prevents him from being miſtaken in it; or which cauſes him, when underſtood, to obey, by ſubduing and ſubjecting the other Affections to it.

There is in reality no rational Creature whatſoever, but knows that when he *voluntarily* offends or does harm to any one, he cannot fail to create an Apprehenſion and Fear of like Harm, and conſequently a Reſentment and Animoſity in every Creature who obſerves him. So that the Offender muſt needs be conſcious to himſelf of being liable to ſuch Treatment from

every one, as if he had in ſome degree offended All. Thus Offence and Injury is always known as puniſhable by every one; and equitable Behaviour, which is therefore call'd MERIT, as rewardable and well deſerving from every one. Theſe Sentiments are ſo natural, that nothing can raſe them out of the Mind, but a Behaviour that is quite oppoſite. Speculative Opinions and Thoughts are not able to efface theſe Impreſſions of Nature. Neither Theiſm, nor Atheiſm, nor Dæmoniſm can, of themſelves, have Influences immediately deſtructive of theſe Sentiments. They cannot effect it but by oppoſite Paſſions.

Nothing can create Sentiments contrary to thoſe of Nature, or give a wrong Senſe or falſe Imagination of Right and Wrong, but the Force of Cuſtom and Education in oppoſition to Nature, as may be noted in thoſe Countries where, according to Cuſtom or politick Inſtitution, certain Actions naturally foul and odious are repeatedly view'd with Applauſe, and Honour aſcrib'd to them. For thus 'tis poſſible that a Man, forcing himſelf, may eat the Fleſh of his Enemies, not only againſt his Stomach, but againſt his Nature, and think it nevertheleſs both Right and Honourable; as ſuppoſing it to be of conſiderable Service to his Community, and capable of advancing the Name, and ſpreading the Terror of his Nation.

But to ſpeak of the Opinions relating to the Deity, and what Effect they may have in this Place. As to Atheiſm, it does not ſeem that it can directly have any Effect at all towards ſetting up a falſe Species of Right and Wrong, tho it be true that licentious Practice favour'd by Atheiſm may produce this Effect. For inſtance,

ſtance, it can never make it be thought that the being able to eat Man's Fleſh, or commit Beſtiality, *is good and excellent in it-ſelf*. But this is certain, that Superſtition may cauſe the committing of many things the moſt horridly unnatural and inhumane, as if they were in themſelves excellent and laudable. For wherever any thing in its Nature odious and abominable, is by Religion advanc'd as the ſuppos'd Will or Pleaſure of a ſupreme Deity; if he who adores that Deity finds nothing in it amiſs, the Deity, of neceſſity, muſt bear the blame, and be look'd upon as a Being naturally ill and odious. But Religion forbids us to imagine any thing like this; ſince it every where preſcribes Eſteem and Honour in company with Worſhip and Adoration. Whoſoever, therefore, teaches us to love and admire a DEITY that has any apparent Character of *Ill*, teaches us at the ſame time to love and admire that Ill; and cauſes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in it ſelf horrid and deteſtable.

If there be a Religion that teaches the Adoration and Love of a GOD, whoſe Character it is to be captious, and of high Reſentment, ſubject to Wrath and Anger, Furious, Revengeful; and revenging himſelf, when offended, on others than thoſe who gave the Offence: and if there be added to the Character of this GOD, a fraudulent Diſpoſition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongſt Men; favourable to a few, tho for ſlight Cauſes, and cruel to the reſt: 'Tis evident that ſuch a Religion as this being ſtrongly enforc'd, muſt, of neceſſity, raiſe even an Approbation and Reſpect towards the Vices of this Kind, and breed a ſuitable Diſpoſition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper. There is but

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one thing that can ſecure the Adorers of this Deity from being miſled, namely, if their Worſhip and Adoration proceeds from mere Example, Cuſtom, Conſtraint, or Fear; or if they had, in Reality, an Abhorrence of what they are conſtrain'd to do by Violence or Force. But if by inſenſible degrees they come to be more and more reconcil'd to the Malignity, Arbitrarineſs, Partiality or Revengefulneſs of their believ'd DEITY, their Reconciliation with theſe Qualities themſelves, will ſoon grow in proportion; and the moſt cruel, unjuſt and barbarous Acts, will, by the Power of this Example, be often conſider'd by them not only as juſt and lawful, but as divine and worthily imitable.

Whoever is perſuaded that there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is juſt and good, muſt ſuppoſe that there is independantly ſuch a Thing as *Juſtice* and *Injuſtice*, *Truth* and *Falſhood*, *Right* and *Wrong*; according to which he pronounces that God is *Juſt*, *Righteous* and *True*. Otherwiſe theſe Words wou'd ſignify nothing at all. If the mere Will, Decree or Law of God be ſaid abſolutely to conſtitute Right and Wrong, then we ſhou'd not underſtand theſe Words. For thus if each Part of a Contradiction were affirm'd for Truth by the Supreme Power, they wou'd conſequently become true. Thus if one Perſon were decreed to ſuffer for another's Fault, the Sentence wou'd be *Juſt* and *Equitable*. And thus, in the ſame manner, if arbitrarily and without Reaſon, ſome Beings were deſtin'd to endure perpetual Ill, and others as conſtantly to enjoy Good: This alſo wou'd paſs under the ſame Denomination. As the ill Character of a God does Injury to the Affections of Men, and leſ-

ſens,

ſens, in them, the natural Senſe of Right and Wrong; ſo, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right Apprehenſions, and a ſound Judgment or Senſe of Right and Wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, repreſented ſuch, as to be actually a true Model and Example of the moſt exact Juſtice, and higheſt Goodneſs and Worth. Such a View of Divine Providence and Bounty extended to *All*, and expreſs'd in a conſtant good Affection towards the Whole, muſt of neceſſity engage us within our Compaſs and Sphere, to act by a like Principle and Affection: and having once the Good of our Species or Publick in View, as our End or Aim, 'tis in a manner impoſſible we ſhou'd be miſguided by any means to a wrong Apprehenſion, or Senſe of Right and Wrong.

In this Caſe, therefore, Religion is capable of doing great Good or Harm; but Atheiſm can have no very great Effect either way, if conſider'd in it-ſelf.

Now to proceed to what may be the Effect of *the Oppoſition made by other Affections to the natural Senſe of Right and Wrong*, in relation to the Opinions Men have of a Deity; it ſeems unqueſtionable, that with the help of a good Education and Reaſon, a Man may form to himſelf Notions of Right and Wrong, as the Author ſhews, without having as yet any Idea of the Exiſtence of a Deity.

Men may obey a Supreme Power, either becauſe they look upon him as a powerful Being that can reward or puniſh them, or becauſe they conſider him as an excellent Being, and therefore think it the Perfection of Nature to imitate and reſemble him.

If he be obey'd purely upon account of Rewards and Puniſhments, ſo that the Creature be incited to do the Good he hates, or reſtrain'd from doing the Ill which he wou'd otherwiſe wiſh to do; there is in this Caſe no Virtue or Goodneſs whatſoever. On the contrary, if there be a Belief or Conception of a Deity who is conſider'd as Worthy and Good, who procures the Welfare of the *Whole*, and has a Concern for the Good of All; ſuch an Example muſt undoubtedly ſerve to raiſe and encreaſe the Affection towards Virtue, and help to ſubdue all other Affections to that alone.

Nor is this Good effected by Example merely. A ſteddy Belief that God ſees All, and ſuperintends All, makes it impoſſible, but as the *Shame* of guilty Actions muſt be the greateſt of any, ſo muſt the *Honour* be of Well-doing, even under the unjuſt Cenſure of a World. And in this Caſe, 'tis very apparent how far conducing a perfect *Theiſm* muſt be to Virtue, and how great a Deficiency there is in *Atheiſm*.

Tho Men ought not to act barely thro a Principle of Fear or Hope, as has been ſaid; it is however certain, that the Belief of a future Retribution may, in many Circumſtances, augment, ſtrengthen and ſupport Virtue, as our Author ſhews at large. I cannot relate every thing he ſays, and it were much better to read it in the Original, which is full of excellent Reflections, and whoſe Clearneſs will be pleaſing to all who underſtand Engliſh. I ſhall only tranſcribe ſome few Paſſages more, and abridge them a little with that Liberty which is neceſſary to make them the better underſtood.

" A Perſon, ſays the Author, who hath
" much of Goodneſs and natural Rectitude
" in

" in his Temper, but withal ſo much Effemi-
" nacy, as unfits him to bear Poverty and Ad-
" verſity; if by ill Fortune he meets with ma-
" ny Trials of this kind, it muſt certainly
" give a Sourneſs and Diſtaſt to his Temper,
" and make him averſe to that which he may
" falſly preſume the Occaſion of ſuch Calamity
" or Ill. Now if his own Thoughts, or the
" corrupt Inſinuations of other Men, preſent
" it often to his Mind, *That his* HONESTY *is the*
" *Occaſion of this Calamity*; and *That if he were*
" *deliver'd from this Reſtraint of* VIRTUE, *he*
" *might be much happier:* His Eſteem of theſe
" good Qualities muſt diminiſh every day,
" as the Temper grows uneaſy and quarrels
" with it-ſelf. But if he thinks *That Honeſty*
" *carrys with it, if not a* preſent, *at leaſt a* fu-
" ture *Advantage, ſuch as to compenſate that Loſs*
" *of private Good which he regrets*; then may
" this Injury to his good Temper and honeſt
" Principle be prevented, and his Love of Vir-
" tue remain as it was before.

" In the ſame manner, where inſtead of *Re-*
" *gard* or *Love*, there is rather an Averſion to
" what is good and virtuous (as for inſtance,
" where *Lenity* and *Forgiveneſs* are deſpis'd,
" and Revenge highly thought of and belov'd)
" if there be this Conſideration added, that
" *Lenity* is by its Rewards, made the Cauſe of
" a greater Self-good and Enjoyment than what
" is found in Revenge, that very Affection of
" *Lenity* and *Mildneſs* may come to be induſtri-
" ouſly nouriſh'd, and the contrary Paſſion de-
" preſs'd. It is the ſame with all other Vir-
" tues."

The Author confirms this, by the Effect which a good Government, juſt and favourable to Virtue, produces in the Mind of Men; and

on the contrary, by the Evil, which a bad Government may produce in a State.

P. 67. "Whoever, says he, by any strong Persuasion or settled Judgment, thinks in the main, "*That Virtue causes Happiness, and Vice Misery*; "carrys with him that Security and Assistance "to Virtue which is requir'd. Or tho he has "no such Thought, nor can believe Virtue his "real Interest, either with respect to his own "Nature and Constitution, or the Circumstances of humane Life; yet if he believes "any Supreme Powers concern'd in the Affairs "of Mankind, and interposing in behalf of "the Honest and Virtuous, against the Impious and Unjust; this will serve to preserve "in him still that just Esteem of Virtue, which "might otherwise diminish. Or shou'd he believe little of the *immediate* or *present* Interposition of Providence in the Affairs of *this* "*Life*; yet if he believes a God dispensing future Rewards and Punishments to Vice and "Virtue in *another*; he carrys with him still the "same Advantage and Security, whilst his "Belief is steddy, and in no wise wavering or "doubtful. For it must be observ'd, that an "Expectation and Dependency, so miraculous "and great as this, must naturally take off "from other inferior Dependencies, and Encouragements. Where infinite Rewards are "thus inforc'd, and the Imagination strongly "turn'd towards them, the other common and "natural Motives to Goodness are apt to be "neglected, and lose much by Disuse. Other "Interests are hardly so much as computed, "whilst the Mind is thus transported in the "Pursuit of a high Advantage and Self-Interest, so narrowly confin'd within our selves. "On this account all other Affections towards

"Friends,

" Friends, Relations or Mankind, are often
" ſlightly regarded, as being *worldly*, and of
" little moment, in reſpect of the Intereſt of
" *our Soul*. And ſo little Thought is there of
" any immediate Satisfaction ariſing from ſuch
" good Offices of Life, that it is the Cuſtom of
" many devout People zealouſly to decry all
" temporal Advantages of Goodneſs, all natu-
" ral Benefits of Virtue: and magnifying the
" contrary Happineſs of a vicious State, to de-
" clare, That except only for the ſake of future
" Reward, and fear of future Puniſhment, they
" wou'd diveſt themſelves of all Goodneſs at
" once, and freely allow themſelves to be moſt
" immoral and profligate. From whence it
" appears, that in ſome reſpects there can be
" nothing more fatal to Virtue, than the weak
" and uncertain Belief of a future Reward and
" Puniſhment. For the Streſs being laid wholly
" here, if this Foundation come to fail, there
" is no further Prop or Security to Mens Mo-
" rals. And thus Virtue is ſupplanted and be-
" tray'd.

" Now as to ATHEISM: tho it be plainly
" deficient, and without remedy, in the caſe of
" *ill Judgment on the Happineſs of Virtue*; yet
" it is not, indeed, of neceſſity the cauſe of any
" ſuch *ill Judgment*. It may be alledg'd per-
" haps, that without an abſolute Aſſent to any
" Hypotheſis of *Theiſm*, the Advantages of
" Virtue may be ſeen and own'd, and a high
" Opinion of it eſtabliſh'd in the Mind. How-
" ever, it muſt be confeſs'd, that the natural
" Tendency of Atheiſm is very different.

" 'Tis in a manner impoſſible, to have any
" great Opinion of the Happineſs of Virtue,
" without conceiving high Thoughts of the
" Satisfaction reſulting from the Love of it:

" And nothing but the Experience of ſuch a " Love is likely to make this Satisfaction be cre- " dited. The chief Ground and Support there- " fore of this Opinion of *Happineſs in Virtue*, " muſt ariſe from the powerful Feeling of this " Affection, and the Knowledg of its Power " and Strength. But this is certain, that it " can be no great ſtrengthening to the moral " Affection, or ſupport to the Love of Good- " neſs, to ſuppoſe that there is neither Good- " neſs nor Beauty in the WHOLE it-ſelf; nor " any Example, or Precedent of good Affec- " tion in any Superior Being. Such a Belief " as this muſt tend rather to the weaning the " Affections from any thing amiable or ſelf- " worthy, and to the ſuppreſſing the very Ha- " bit and familiar Cuſtom of admiring natural " Beauties, or whatever in the Order of Things " is according to juſt Deſign, Harmony, and " Proportion. For how little diſpos'd muſt a " Perſon be, to love or admire any thing as " *orderly* in the Univerſe, who thinks the Uni- " verſe it-ſelf a Pattern of Diſorder ?

" Nothing indeed can be more melancholy, " than the Thought of living in a diſtracted " Univerſe, from whence many Ills may be ſuſ- " pected, and where there is nothing good or " lovely that preſents it-ſelf, nothing that can " ſatisfy in Contemplation, or raiſe any Paſſion " beſides that of Contempt, Hatred or Diſlike. " Such an Opinion as this may by degrees im- " bitter the Temper; and not only make the " Love of Virtue to be leſs felt, but help to " impair and ruin the very Principle of Virtue, " *viz. natural* and *kind Affection*.

" Upon the Whole; whoever has a firm Belief " of a GOD, whom he does not *merely call* Good, " but of whom in reality he *believes* nothing but

" *real*

" *real Good*, nothing but what is truly ſutable
" to the exacteſt Character of Benignity and
" Goodneſs; ſuch a Perſon believing Rewards
" or Retributions in another Life, muſt believe
" them annex'd to real Goodneſs and Merit,
" real Villany and Baſeneſs, and not to any ac-
" cidental Qualities or Circumſtances; in which
" reſpect they cannot properly be ſtil'd *Rewards*
" or *Puniſhments*, but *capricious Diſtributions of*
" *Happineſs or Unhappineſs to Creatures*. Theſe
" are the only Terms on which the Belief of a
" World to come, can happily influence the
" Believer. And on theſe Terms, and by vir-
" tue of this Belief, Man may retain his Vir-
" tue and Integrity, even under the hardeſt
" Thoughts of humane Nature; when either
" by any ill Circumſtance or untoward Doctrine,
" he is brought to that unfortunate Opinion of
" *Virtue's being naturally an Enemy to Happineſs*
" *in Life*.

" This, however, is an Opinion which can
" hardly be ſuppos'd conſiſtent with ſound
" *Theiſm*. For whatever be decided as to a
" future Life, or the Rewards and Puniſhments
" of hereafter; he who, as a ſound Theiſt, be-
" lieves a reigning Mind, Sovereign in Nature,
" and ruling all things with the higheſt Perfec-
" tion of Goodneſs, as well as Wiſdom and
" Power, cannot but of neceſſity believe Virtue
" to be naturally good and advantageous. For
" what is there that cou'd more ſtrongly imply
" an unjuſt Ordinance, a Blot and Imperfection
" in the general Conſtitution of Things, than
" to ſuppoſe Virtue the natural Ill, and Vice
" the natural Good of any Creature?

" And now laſt of all, there remains for us
" to propoſe a further Advantage to Virtue,
" in the Theiſtical Belief above the Atheiſtical.

" There

" There is no Creature, but muſt be ill in ſome
" degree, by having any Affection or Averſion
" in a ſtronger degree than is ſutable to his
" own private Good, or that of the Syſtem to
" which he is join'd. For in either caſe, the Af-
" fection is *Ill* and vicious. Now if a rational
" Creature has that degree of Averſion which
" is requiſite to arm him againſt any particular
" Misfortune, and alarm him againſt the ap-
" proach of any Calamity; this is regular and
" well. But if after the Misfortune is happen'd,
" his Averſion continues ſtill, and his Paſſion
" rather grows upon him; whilſt he rages at
" the accident, and exclaims againſt his private
" Fortune or Lot; this will be acknowledg'd
" to be vicious *in preſent*, and *for the future*;
" as it affects the Temper, and diſturbs that
" eaſy Courſe of the Affections on which Virtue
" and Goodneſs ſo much depend. On the other
" ſide, the patient enduring of the Calamity,
" and the bearing up of the Mind under it,
" muſt be acknowledg'd *immediately* virtuous,
" and *preſervative of Virtue*.

" Now according to the Hypotheſis of thoſe
" who exclude a General Mind, it muſt be con-
" feſs'd, there can nothing happen in the Courſe
" of things to deſerve either our Admiration
" and Love, our Anger or our Abhorrence.
" However, as there can be no Satisfaction
" at the beſt in thinking upon what *Atoms and*
" *Chance* produce; ſo upon diſaſterous Occa-
" ſions, and under the Circumſtances of a ca-
" lamitous and hard Fortune, 'tis ſcarce poſſible
" to prevent a natural kind of Abhorrence and
" Spleen, which will be entertain'd and kept
" alive by the Imagination of ſo perverſe an
" Order of Things. But in another Hypothe-
" ſis (that of perfect *Theiſm*) it is under-

" ſtood,

" ſtood, *That whatever the Order of the World*
" *produces, is in the main both juſt and good.*
" Therefore in the Courſe of things in this
" World, whatever Hardſhip of Events may
" ſeem to force from any rational Creature a
" hard Cenſure of his private Condition or
" Lot, he may by Reflection nevertheleſs come
" to have Patience, and to acquieſce in it. Nor
" is this all, he may go farther ſtill in this Re-
" conciliation, and from the ſame Principle
" may make the Lot it ſelf an Object of his
" good Affection; whilſt he ſtrives to maintain
" this generous Fealty, and ſtands ſo well diſ-
" pos'd towards the Laws and Government of
" *his higher Country.*"

The Author adds ſome Reflections to this, and concludes from thence, that Virtue and Piety are ſo ally'd together, that the firſt cannot be compleat but in the latter; ſince where the latter is wanting, there can neither be the ſame Benignity, Firmneſs or Conſtancy, the ſame good Compoſure of the Affections, or Uniformity of Mind. And thus the Perfection and Height of Virtue muſt be owing to the Belief of a God.

II. After having ſhewn what Virtue is, and to whom the Character belongs, the Author undertakes to ſhew what Obligation there is to Virtue, or what Reaſon to embrace it. Book II. Part I.

It was prov'd that a reaſonable Creature, to deſerve the name of Good or Virtuous, muſt have all his Inclinations ſo diſpos'd as to agree with the Good of his *Kind*, or of that Syſtem in which he is included, and of which he is only a Part. To ſtand thus well affected, not only in reſpect of one's ſelf, but of Society and the Publick, this is Rectitude, Integrity, or Virtue; to be wanting in this Diſpoſition, or to have its contrary, is Depravity, Corruption and Vice.

It

It cannot be deny'd that it is as natural to Man to be thus well affected towards his Kind, as it is to any Organ of an Animal Body, or mere Vegetable, to work in its own Courſe for the preſervation of their Whole. "It is not "more natural, *ſays the Author*, for the Sto- "mach to digeſt, the Lungs to breathe, the "Glands to ſeparate Juices, or other Entrails "to perform their ſeveral Offices (however "they may ſometimes be diſorder'd or ob- "ſtructed in their Operations) than it is to "Men to procure the Good of the Society, of "which they are Members."

Allowing therefore that Man has ſuch Affections as theſe towards the common Nature or Syſtem of the Kind, at the ſame time that he loves himſelf; it muſt neceſſarily happen, that in following the firſt of theſe Affections, he muſt, on many occaſions, contradict the latter; becauſe otherwiſe the Species could not be preſerv'd. Without this, what would ſignify that natural Affection, by which a Creature preſerves its Offspring, and ſupports its Kind, thro ſo many Difficulties and Hazards?

It may therefore be imagin'd perhaps, that the Love of one's own private Good, and the Love of the publick Good, are perfectly oppoſite; ſo that a Man cannot give himſelf up entirely to the purſuit of the one, without doing wrong to the other. Hazards and Hardſhips are naturally the Ill of the private State; and the public Good leading often to ſuch Hazards and Hardſhips, 'tis preſently infer'd, that 'tis the Creature's Intereſt to be without any public Affection whatever. But he afterwards makes appear, that the public Good and the private may ſtand very well together.

There

There are few Men, however, who when they conſider a Creature void of all natural Affection, and wholly deſtitute of a *Social* Principle, will ſuppoſe him at the ſame time either tolerably happy in himſelf, or in reſpect to his Fellow-Creatures. 'Tis generally thought, that a Creature feels but ſmall Enjoyment in Life, after he has loſt all Senſe of Humanity or good Nature, and cares for no Man elſe beſides. He muſt of neceſſity be moroſe, rancorous and malignant; becauſe being deſtitute of Mildneſs and Benignity, he muſt conſequently become a Prey to the contrary Paſſions. Such a Heart as this muſt be a continual Seat of perverſe Inclinations and violent Averſions, rais'd from a conſtant ill Humour, Sourneſs and Diſquiet. A Man who is conſcious of theſe Paſſions, and ſees himſelf obnoxious to Mankind, muſt have his Mind over-clouded with Suſpicions and Jealouſies, which fill it with Fears and Horror, and raiſe in it a continual Diſturbance, even in the moſt flouriſhing Condition of his Affairs, and in the higheſt Degree of outward Proſperity.

'Tis plain from hence, that a Man in this Condition would be very miſerable; and we may conclude for that reaſon, that ſome Means muſt neceſſarily be found out to reconcile Self-Love with the Love of the Public, in order to enjoy any Happineſs. For this purpoſe we are to examine Man in himſelf, and euquire into the Principles of his Actions.

Man, like all other Animals, is acted by nothing but inward Springs, which may be call'd Paſſions; ſuch as Fear, Love, or Hatred. It is impoſſible that a weaker Affection ſhou'd overcome a ſtronger; as 'tis alſo impoſſible that where

the Paſſions are ſtrongeſt, either in Number or Force, but a Man muſt incline to 'em; and according to this Ballance he muſt be govern'd and led to Action.

The Affections that govern Man, are either the natural Affections which lead to the Good of the Public, or the Self-Affections which lead only to the Good of the Private; or ſuch as are neither of theſe, nor tending either to any Good of the Public or Private, but contrariwiſe, and which may therefore be juſtly ſtil'd *unnatural Affections*. Theſe latter are viſibly vicious; but the two former may be either vicious or virtuous, according to their degree, which may either be too high or too low, as our Author makes appear. Theſe Paſſions muſt be kept in a juſt Ballance, to reap any Benefit from them, otherwiſe they become vicious: as when we ſee either the Love of the Public too weak and deficient, or the Love of one's ſelf too ſtrong and violent; or elſe when Paſſions ariſe that are oppoſite to the public Good and the private. Men cannot become vicious any otherwiſe than by one of theſe three ways; ſo that if once it be prov'd that it is really not the Creature's Intereſt to be thus vicioully affected, but contrariwiſe, we ſhall then have prov'd that it is his Intereſt to be wholly good and virtuous. The Buſineſs therefore will be to prove, 1. That to have the natural Inclinations of Friendſhip and Generoſity towards the Good of the Public, is to have the chief Means and Power of Self-Enjoyment; and that to want them is certain Miſery and Ill. 2. That to have the private or Self-Affections too ſtrong, or beyond their degree of Subordination to the natural Love of the Kind, is alſo miſerable. 3. That to have the unnatural Af-

fections

fections (*viz.* ſuch as are neither founded on the Intereſt of the Kind or Public, nor of the private Perſon or Creature himſelf) is to be miſerable in the higheſt degree. This is the Subject of the three Sections of the Second Part of our Author's Second Book.

1. There are Pleaſures of the Body, and there are Pleaſures of the Mind; yet it cannot be deny'd but the latter are preferable to the other, becauſe of the Inconſtancy of the former, and for other Reaſons which I omit. Among the Pleaſures of the Mind, there are none equal to thoſe which ariſe from the Diſpoſition of a Man under a lively Affection of Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generoſity, Pity, Succour, and whatever elſe is of a ſocial or friendly ſort. He who has ever ſo little knowledg of Human Nature, is ſenſible what Pleaſure the Mind receives when it is touch'd in this generous way. The difference we find between Solitude and Company, or between a common Company or that of Friends; the reference of almoſt all our Pleaſures to mutual Converſe, and the dependence they have on Society either preſent or imagin'd; all theſe are ſufficient Proofs of it, as our Author more at large demonſtrates.

The Effects of this Diſpoſition prove the ſame thing, ſince we are ſenſible that we have a perfecter enjoyment of any Good by communicating it to our Friends, and that we receive it as it were by Reflection, or by way of Participation in the Good of others. We likewiſe feel with a very great Satisfaction the Friendſhip others have for us; and the inward Conſciouſneſs that we have merited their Eſteem and Approbation, fills us with a pleaſing Delight.

" What Tyrant is there, what Robber, or " open Violater of the Laws of Society, who " has not a Companion, or ſome particular " Set, either of his own Kindred, or ſuch as " he calls Friends; with whom he gladly ſhares " his Good; in whoſe Welfare he delights; " and whoſe Joy and Satisfaction he makes *his* " *own?* Who is there that receives not ſome " impreſſions from the Flattery or Kindneſs " of ſuch as are familiar with him? 'Tis to this " ſoothing Hope and Expectation of Friend- " ſhip, that almoſt all our Actions have ſome " reference. 'Tis this that goes thro our " whole Lives, and mixes it-ſelf even with moſt " of our Vices. Of this, *Vanity*, *Ambition*, " and *Luxury*, have a ſhare; and many other " Diſorders of our Life partake: even the un- " chaſteſt Love borrows largely from this " Source. So that were Pleaſure to be com- " puted in the way other things commonly are; " it might properly be ſaid, that out of theſe " two Branches, viz. *Community or Participa-* " *tion in the Pleaſures of others*, and *Belief of me-* " *riting well from others*, wou'd ariſe more than " nine tenths of all that is enjoy'd in Life. " And thus in the main Sum of Happineſs there " is ſcarce a ſingle Article, but what derives " it-ſelf from ſocial Love, and depends imme- " diately on the natural and kind Affections."

The Author afterwards ſhews, that as the natural Affection or ſocial Love is perfect or imperfect, ſo muſt be the Content and Happi- neſs depending on it: and concludes with theſe Words. " It is equal, conſtant, accountable " to it-ſelf, ever-ſatisfactory and pleaſing. It " gains Applauſe and Love from the *beſt*; and, " in all diſintereſted Caſes, from the very *worſt* " of Men. We may ſay of it, with Juſtice, that

" that it carrys with it a Conſciouſneſs of me-
" rited Love and Approbation from all Society,
" from all intelligent Creatures, and from what-
" ever is Original to all other Intelligence.
" And if there be in Nature any ſuch *Original*,
" as all Theiſts are perſuaded; we may add,
" that the Satisfaction which attends *intire Af-*
" *fection*, is full, and noble, in proportion to
" its *final Object*, which contains all Perfection,
" according to the Senſe of Theiſm above no-
" ted. For this, as has been ſhewn, is the Re-
" ſult of *Virtue*. And to have this INTIRE
" AFFECTION or INTEGRITY of Mind, is
" *to live according to Nature*, and the Dictates
" and Rules of Supreme Wiſdom. This is
" Morality, Juſtice, Piety, and Natural Reli-
" gion".

The Author demonſtrates this afterwards in a manner leſs ſcholaſtical, and in Terms and Phraſes of more familiar uſe: but he who ſhall have once well comprehended the Premiſes, will eaſily deduce the Conſequences that ariſe from them.

He proceeds afterwards to *Conſcience*, or the inward Senſe we have of what we are; and obſerves very well that, " Every reaſoning or
" reflecting Creature is, by his Nature, forc'd
" to endure the *Review* of his own Mind, and
" Actions; and to have Repreſentations of
" himſelf, and his inward Affairs, conſtantly
" paſſing before him, obvious to him, and re-
" volving in his Mind. Now as nothing can be
" more grievous than this, to one who has
" thrown off *natural Affection*; ſo nothing can
" be more delightful to one who has preſerv'd
" it with Sincerity. There are two things,
" which to a natural Creature muſt be horridly
" offenſive and grievous; *viz.* To have the
" Reflection

" Reflection in his Mind of any unjuſt Action or
" Behaviour, which he knows to be *Odious*
" and *Ill-deſerving:* or of any fooliſh Action
" or Behaviour, prejudicial to his own Intereſt
" or Happineſs."

The former of theſe two is what is properly call'd *Conſcience*, whether in a Moral or Religious ſenſe. And the other may be call'd a *Conſcience from Intereſt*. The Author makes ſome Reflections upon both; by which it appears that Man naturally knows when he does well, and when he does Ill: and from thence our Author concludes, that our Happineſs entirely depends on the Preſervation of *natural and good Affections*. For if the Chief Happineſs be from the mental Pleaſures; and the Chief mental Pleaſures are ſuch as have been deſcrib'd, and are founded in natural Affection; it follows, that *to have the natural Affections, is to have the Chief Means and Power of Self-Enjoyment, the higheſt Poſſeſſion and Happineſs of Life.*

It may likewiſe be ſaid, that the Pleaſures of the Body, and which regard nothing but the Satisfaction of the Senſes, cannot poſſibly have their Effect, or afford any valuable Enjoyment, but by the means of *ſocial* and *natural Affection*. And the Author proves it very plainly. He likewiſe ſhews, that to be happy, the natural Affections muſt of neceſſity counterballance each other; and each muſt remain in the degree it ought to be in, without which we cannot be happy. The Reſult of the whole is, That as on one ſide, *to have the natural and good Affections, is to have the Chief Means and Power of Self-Enjoyment*; ſo on the other ſide, *to want them is certain Miſery and Ill.*

Book II. Part 2. Sect. 2.

2. Our Author afterwards proceeds to prove, that by having the Self-Paſſions too intenſe or ſtrong, a Creature becomes miſerable. The

The Paſſions of which this Self-Love conſiſts, are *Love of Life*; —— *Reſentment of Injury*; —— *Pleaſure*, or *Appetite towards Nouriſhment, and the Means of Generation*; —— *Intereſt*, or *Deſire of thoſe Conveniences by which we are well provided for, and maintain'd*; —— *Emulation*, or *Love of Praiſe and Honour*; —— *Indolence*, or *Love of Eaſe and Reſt*. —— Theſe are the Paſſions that form what we call Self-Love. If theſe Paſſions are moderate and within certain bounds, they bring no Prejudice to the Society: but being in an extreme degree, they become *Cowardice*, —— *Revengefulneſs*, —— *Luxury*, —— *Avarice*, —— *Vanity* and *Ambition*, —— *Sloth*. All theſe Diſpoſitions are vicious and hurtful to humane Society, as well with regard to the Private as Public. This is what our Author plainly proves, by examining them ſeverally. Theſe Paſſions, when they are violent, being the certain Means of extinguiſhing the *natural Affections*, and raiſing in us horrid and unnatural Paſſions, cannot but make us very miſerable.

3. Tho the Thing be ſufficiently manifeſt to ſuch as are capable of meditating a little upon our Author's Principles; yet he proceeds to prove it more at large in the laſt Section of the Second Book, by examining ſeverally each of the Vices which may be call'd *unnatural Affections*. Book II. Part 2. Sect. 3.

Such, for example, are that *unnatural and inhumane Delight* in beholding Torments, and in viewing *Diſtreſs*, *Calamity*, *Blood*, and the like, with a peculiar Joy and Pleaſure; *Petulancy* or a *wanton Miſchievouſneſs*, *Malignity*, *Envy*, *Moroſeneſs*, or *Miſantropy*; *Inhoſpitality*, *Barbarity*, *Superſtition*, *unnatural Luſts*, *enormous Pride*, *Ambition*, *Arrogance*, *Tyranny*, *Revengefulneſs*, *implacable Hatred*, *Treachery*, *Ingratitude*, &c. It

It cannot but be allow'd our Author, that theſe Vices are the means of rendering ſuch Men unhappy as are ſubject to them; eſpecially when there is a Complication of them, as it often happens, or that they grow to any conſiderable pitch. " But it may be objected " here, *ſays he*, that theſe Paſſions, *unnatural* " as they are, carry ſtill a ſort of *Pleaſure* " with them; and that however barbarous a " Pleaſure it be, yet ſtill it is a Pleaſure and Sa- " tisfaction which is found in Pride, or Tyran- " ny, Revenge, Malice, or Cruelty exerted. " Now if it be poſſible in Nature, that any " one can feel a barbarous or malicious Joy, " otherwiſe than in conſequence of mere An- " guiſh and Torment, then may we perhaps " allow this kind of Satisfaction to be call'd " *Pleaſure*, or *Delight*. But the Caſe is evi- " dently contrary. To love and to be kind; " to have ſocial or natural Affection, Compla- " cency and Good-Will, is to feel immediate " Satisfaction and genuine Content. 'Tis in " it-ſelf *Original Joy*, depending on no preced- " ing Pain or Uneaſineſs; and producing no- " thing but Satisfaction merely. On the other " ſide, Animoſity, Hatred and Bitterneſs is " *original Miſery* and *Torment*, producing no " other Pleaſure or Satisfaction, than as the " unnatural Deſire is for the inſtant ſatisfy'd " by ſomething that appeaſes it. How ſtrong " ſoever, therefore, this Pleaſure may appear; " it does but the more imply the Miſery of " that State which produces it. For as the " cruelleſt bodily Pains do by intervals of Aſ- " ſuagement, produce (as has been ſhewn) " the higheſt bodily Pleaſure; ſo the fierce ſtand " moſt raging Torments of the Mind, do, by " certain moments of Relief, afford the grea-

" teſt

" teſt of mental Enjoyments, to thoſe who
" know little of the truer Kind.
" The Men of gentleſt Diſpoſitions, and beſt
" of Tempers, have at ſome time or other
" been ſufficiently acquainted with thoſe Di-
" ſturbances which, at ill Hours, even ſmall
" Occaſions are apt to raiſe. From theſe ſlen-
" der Experiences of Harſhneſs and ill Humour,
" they fully know, and will confeſs the ill Mo-
" ments that are paſs'd, when the Temper is
" ever ſo little gall'd or fretted. How muſt it
" fare, therefore, with thoſe who hardly know
" any better Hours in Life; and who, for the
" greateſt part of it, are agitated by a thorow
" active Spleen, a cloſe and ſettled Malignity,
" and Rancor? How lively muſt be the ſenſe
" of every thwarting and controuling Acci-
" dent? How great muſt be the ſhocks of Diſ-
" appointment, the ſtings of Affront, and the
" Agonies of a working Antipathy, againſt
" the multiply'd Objects of Offence? Nor can
" it, therefore, be wonder'd at, if to Perſons
" thus agitated and oppreſs'd, it ſeems a high
" Delight to appeaſe and allay for the while
" thoſe furious and rough Motions, by an In-
" dulgence of their Paſſion in Miſchief and Re-
" venge."

They who have loſt all natural Senſe of Goodneſs and Virtue, feel what Diſpoſition they have towards others, nor are they ignorant of the mutual Diſpoſitions of others towards them. They are very conſcious they have not merited the Love or Affection of any Perſon; but on the contrary, the ill Will and Hatred of all Mankind. What Ground muſt this afford for Horror and Deſpair? What Foundation of Fear and continual Apprehenſion from Mankind, and from Superior Powers? How thorow and deep

muſt be that Melancholy which has nothing ſoft or pleaſing from the ſide of Friendſhip to delay or divert it? Wherever ſuch a Creature turns himſelf, every thing muſt appear Ghaſtly and Horrible; every thing hoſtile, and as it were bent againſt a private and ſingle Being, who is thus divided from every thing, and in continual War with the reſt of Nature.

Their Soul becomes, according to the Author's Expreſſion, a vaſt Wilderneſs where all is laid waſte, every thing fair and goodly remov'd, and nothing extant but what is Savage and Deform'd. Now if Baniſhment from one's own Country, Confinement to a foreign Place, or any thing that looks like Solitude or Deſertion, be ſo heavy to endure; what muſt it be to feel this *inward Baniſhment*, this real Eſtrangement from human Commerce, and to be after this manner in a Deſart, and in the horrideſt of Solitudes, even when in the midſt of Society? What muſt it be to live in this Diſagreement with every thing, this Irreconcilableneſs and Oppoſition to the Order and Government of the Univerſe?

Hence it appears, that the greateſt of Miſeries accompany that State which is conſequent to the Loſs of *natural Affection*; and that *to have thoſe horrid, monſtrous and unnatural Affections, is to be miſerable in the higheſt degree.*

Whoever ſhall beſtow ſome Meditation upon what has been ſaid, and eſpecially read the Original; muſt grant that the Author has evidently prov'd what he undertook to ſhew: nor will ſuch a one refuſe to ſubſcribe to his Concluſion, which I ſhall here put down at full Length.

" Since in the common and known Senſe of " *Vice and Illneſs*, no one can be vicious or ill

" but

" but either, by the Deficiency or Weakneſs
" of *natural Affections*; or by the Violence of
" *the Selfiſh*; or by ſuch as are plainly *unnatu-*
" *ral:* It muſt follow, that if each of theſe are
" pernicious and deſtructive to the Creature,
" inſomuch that his compleateſt State of Miſery
" is made from hence; *To be wicked or vicious,*
" *is, To be miſerable and unhappy.*

" And ſince every vicious Action muſt in
" proportion, more or leſs, help towards this
" Miſchief and *Self-Ill*; it muſt follow, That
" *every vicious Action muſt be ſelf-injurious and*
" *Ill.*

" On the other ſide; the Happineſs and
" Good of *Virtue* has been prov'd from the
" contrary Effect of other Affections, ſuch as
" are according to Nature, and the Oeco-
" nomy of the Species or Kind. We may caſt
" up all thoſe particulars, from whence (as by
" way of Addition and Subſtraction) the main
" Sum or general Account of Happineſs, is ei-
" ther augmented or diminiſh'd. And if there
" be no Article exceptionable in this Scheme of
" *Moral Arithmetic*; the Subject treated may
" be ſaid to have an Evidence as great as that
" which is found in Numbers, or Mathematics.
" For let us carry Scepticiſm ever ſo far; let
" us doubt, if we can, of every thing about
" us; we cannot doubt of what paſſes *within*
" *our-ſelves.* Our Paſſions and Affections are
" known to us. They are certain, whatever
" the Objects may be, on which they are em-
" ploy'd. Nor is it of any concern to our
" Argument how theſe exterior Objects ſtand;
" whether they are Realities, or mere Illuſions;
" whether we wake or dream. For *ill Dreams*
" will be equally diſturbing: And a *good Dream*
" (if Life be nothing elſe) will be eaſily and

" happily pass'd. In this Dream, of Life, there-
" fore, our Demonstrations have the same
" Force; our *Ballance* and *Oeconomy* hold good,
" and our Obligation to *Virtue* is in every re
" spect the same.

" Upon the whole: There is not, I presume,
" the least degree of Certainty wanting, in
" what has been said concerning the Prefera-
" bleness of the mental Pleasures to the sensual;
" and even of the sensual, accompany'd with
" good Affection, and under a temperate and
" right Use, to those that are no ways re-
" strain'd, nor supported by any thing Social
" or Affectionate.

" Nor is there less Evidence in what has
" been said, of the united Structure and Fa-
" bric of the Mind, and of those Passions
" which constitute the Temper, or Soul; and
" on which its Happiness or Misery so imme-
" diately depends. It has been shewn, That
" in this Constitution, the impairing of any
" one Part must instantly tend to the Disorder
" and Ruin of other Parts, and of the Whole
" it-self, thro the necessary Connexion and Bal-
" lance of the Affections: That those very
" Passions thro which Men are vicious, are of
" themselves a Torment and Disease; and that
" whatsoever is done which is knowingly *Ill*,
" must be of *Ill Consciousness*; and in propor-
" tion, as the Act is ill, must impair and cor-
" rupt social Enjoyment, and destroy both the
" Capacity of kind Affection, and the Consci-
" ousness of meriting any such. So that nei-
" ther can we participate thus in Joy and
" Happiness with others, or receive Satisfaction
" from the mutual Kindness or imagin'd Love
" of others; on which however the greatest of
" all our Pleasures are founded.

" If

" If this be the Caſe of Moral Delinquency;
" and if the State which is conſequent to this
" Defection from Nature, be of all other the
" moſt horrid, oppreſſive, and miſerable:
" 'twill appear, *That to yield or conſent to any*
" *thing ill or immoral, is a Breach of Intereſt, and*
" *leads to the greateſt Ills:* and, *That*, on the
" other ſide, *Every thing which is an Improve-*
" *ment of Virtue, or an Eſtabliſhment of right*
" *Affection and Integrity, is an Advancement of*
" *Intereſt, and leads to the greateſt and moſt*
" *ſolid Happineſs and Enjoyment of Life.*

" Thus the Wiſdom of what rules, and is
" *firſt* and *chief in Nature*, has made it to be ac-
" cording to the private Intereſt and Good of
" every one, to work towards the general
" Good; which if a Creature ceaſes to promote,
" he is ſo far wanting to himſelf, and ceaſes to
" promote his own Happineſs and Welfare.
" He is, on this account, his own Enemy:
" Nor can he any otherwiſe be good or uſeful
" to himſelf, than as he is good to Society,
" and to that *Whole* of which he is himſelf
" *a Part.* So that *Virtue*, which of all Excel-
" lencies and Beauties is the Chief, and moſt
" amiable; *that* which is the proper Ornament
" of human Affairs; which upholds Commu-
" nities, maintains Union, Friendſhip, and
" Correſpondence amongſt Men; *that* by which
" Countries as well as Families flouriſh and are
" happy; and for want of which every thing
" comely, conſpicuous, great and worthy, muſt
" periſh; *That ſingle Quality*, thus beneficial to
" all Society, and to Mankind in general, is
" found equally a Good to each Creature in
" particular. And thus *Virtue is the Good, and*
" *Vice the Ill of every one.*

Thus

Thus concludes our Author, who ought to be applauded by all ſenſible Men. Tho he does not name *Hobbes*, yet he confutes his Opinion concerning the natural State of Man, which he abſurdly pretends to be *a State of War*, and foreign to all Society. This, according to him, is the State of Nature: and tho Men are ſeen to live otherwiſe, they were induc'd to it thro Neceſſity and Fear, which put them upon forming Societies and eſtabliſhing Laws. It is true, the preſent Condition of human Nature obliges Men to act thus; but the Author of Nature eſtabliſh'd things as they are, with intent only, to lead Men, by the neceſſity of ſubſiſting, to do what Reaſon dictates to them, as our Author has manifeſtly made appear.

TREATISE V.

The MORALISTS.

A Philoſophical Rhapſody; being a Recital of certain Converſations, upon Natural and Moral Subjects.

THE *Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm* has ſhewn the Folly of thoſe who act by a violent and unreaſonable Enthuſiaſm; and this introduces a rational Enthuſiaſt, who by little and little reclaims a Sceptic, without putting

putting him, in the leaſt, into a Heat. This Book, which the Author modeſtly calls *A Philoſophical Rhapſody, &c.* is likewiſe extremely well writ, and full of noble and lively Expreſſions; but it wou'd be very difficult to be tranſlated into *French*, by reaſon of the figurative Diſcourſes, which he, who acts the Enthuſiaſt, holds therein. Theſe are Dialogues, which might be ſaid to be a ſort of an Imitation of *Plato*'s, were not the *Engliſh* Dialogues more clear, more conciſe, and likewiſe quite otherwiſe animated, than thoſe of that Philoſopher.

To make an Abſtract of it requires more Room than we have here. It is divided into three Parts; the Firſt is as it were the Introduction. *Philocles*, who was a Sceptic, begins therein to relate to *Palemon*, how he had been converted by *Theocles* a Country Gentleman, who is the rational Enthuſiaſt I juſt now mention'd. The Second Part contains a great many Difficulties, the plain Solution whereof is not ſeen till the Third. The Author not having diminiſh'd the ſtrength of the Difficulties, by propoſing them unfairly, or in a dull and diſagreeable manner; but given them all the Weight, which they cou'd have either in Fact or Form; it may happen that ſome body who ſhou'd light upon theſe Dialogues, and ſtop at the Second Part, wou'd think the Author rather meant to deſtroy than build. But he will be deceiv'd; for in the Third Part, he very ſolidly eſtabliſhes this general Principle of Religion, That there is a God, who governs the World, and who is the Cauſe of all the Order which is therein ſeen. There are in this Part ſome Meditations of *Theocles*, upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature, upon the Beauty of the Univerſe, and upon Beauty in general,

which are conceiv'd in a Poetical Stile; a little like that of *Telemachus*, as far as the Difference of the Subjects will ſuffer us to compare theſe two Works.

I wou'd gladly have related ſome Part of this Work in *French*, without loſing any of its Beauty; but I deſpair of this, becauſe the Style of the Dialogues is in ſuch a pure pathetic *Engliſh*, that the *French* Tongue is but languid, in compariſon of it. I ſhall however inſert one Paſſage here, which ſeems to me to be one of the fineſt, in which *Theocles*, or the rational Enthuſiaſt, thus repreſents the Sentiments of *Philocles*, who is the converted Sceptic. "There "can be no ſuch thing as real *Valuableneſs*, or "*Worth*; nothing in it-ſelf eſtimable or ami-"able, odious or ſhameful. All is OPINION; "'Tis *Opinion* which makes Beauty, and un-"makes it. The Graceful or Ungraceful in "Things, the Decorum and its Contrary, the "Amiable and Unamiable, Vice, Virtue, Ho-"nour, Shame; all this is founded in *Opinion* "only. OPINION is the *Law* and *Meaſure*. "Nor has *Opinion* any Rule beſides mere "CHANCE, which varies it as *Cuſtom* varies; "and makes now this, now that, to be thought "worthy, according to the Reign of *Faſhion*, "and the aſcendent Power of *Education*.

"What ſhall we ſay (continues *Theocles*, to refute theſe ſceptical Principles) "to ſuch a "one? How repreſent to him his Abſurdity "and Extravagance? Will he deſiſt the ſooner? "Or ſhall we ask *what Shame*, of one who ac-"knowledges *no Shameful*? Yet he derides, and "cries Ridiculous! By what Right? What "Title? For thus, if I were PHILOCLES, "wou'd I defend my ſelf. Am I ridiculous? "As how? *What* is ridiculous? *Every-thing?*

"or

" or *Nothing?* Ridiculous indeed! But ſome-
" thing then, ſomething there is ridiculous:
" and the Notion it ſeems is right, of a Shame-
" ful and Ridiculous in Things."

He afterwards puſhes on his Thought, and very well ſhews, that there are invariable Ideas of *Beauty* and *Uglineſs*, in Moral matters. But I cannot follow him here. I ſhall content my ſelf to ſay in general, that the more one reads theſe Dialogues, the more Delicacy and Beauty one finds in them; and that even in the Sceptic's Diſcourſes, who laughs at every thing, there are important Truths.

TREATISE VI.

Miſcellaneous Reflections on the former Treatiſes, and other Critical Subjects.

THERE are ſeveral Paſſages, in this Volume, relating to the *Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm*, the *Eſſay upon the Freedom of Wit and Raillery*, *Advice to an Author*, and *the Moraliſts*. The Author defends thoſe Treatiſes againſt the Criticiſm of certain Perſons who had attack'd them. But beſides this, there are many Thoughts, new, or differently manag'd, from what they are in thoſe Works. The Book conſiſting of Miſcellaneous Thoughts, and the Author not thinking himſelf ſervilely ty'd down to Order, I cannot make ſuch a coherent Extract of it as of the preceding

Piece. It may, however, be ſaid, that the greateſt part of it regards the Abuſes which are put upon Religion, and the ill Conduct of Eccleſiaſtics. I ſhall give ſome Paſſages of it, by pointing briefly to the principal Materials. There are five *Miſcellanies*, and every *Miſcellany* is divided into ſome *Chapters*, more or leſs.

I. 1. The Author begins with praiſing the Conveniency of publiſhing his Thoughts, without being ſubject to any certain Order, under the Name of Miſcellany. Undoubtedly he is in the right: and it is much better to deliver good Thoughts, upon ſeveral Subjects, without being tortur'd to form a Syſtem of them; than to compoſe a Syſtem, only becauſe one has ſome new Thoughts upon a Subject. Our Author herein has us'd a gay and pleaſant Style, which diverts his Reader, at the ſame time that it inſtructs him; ſo that one may juſtly apply to him the Verſe of *Horace*:

Omne tulit punctum qui miſcuit utile dulci.

2. When any one reflects upon another, or has been reflected upon, there will always be found Bookſellers, or others who flatter and ſtir up the Authors that are enter'd the Liſts, as if they had foil'd their Adverſary, or as if it was abſolutely neceſſary to anſwer him. Here he introduces an Author anſwering his Bookſeller, who preſſes him to write: "E'er you "prepare your Artillery, or engage me in Acts "of Hoſtility, let me hear, I intreat you, whe-"ther or no my Adverſary be taken notice "of—Wait for his Second Edition; and if "by next Year, or a Year or two after, it be "known in good Company that there is ſuch "a Book in being, I ſhall then perhaps think it

"time

" time to conſider of a Reply". He is certainly in the right in what he ſays: for learned Quarrels are abſolutely forgot, ſo ſoon as the Parties concern'd ſpeak no more of them; nor are their Books read, when they publiſh ſeveral of them upon the ſame Subject.

3. He proves that, in the *Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm*, the Reader was not to expect the Method of a Treatiſe. He ſpeaks of Letters in general, and makes ſeveral good Remarks upon the manner of writing them, and particularly upon thoſe of *Seneca*; whoſe Part he takes againſt *Dion Caſſius*, who affected to ſpeak ill of the moſt illuſtrious *Romans*.

II. 1. The Author in reviewing the Subject of the Letter concerning *Enthuſiaſm*, (which is nothing but a Motion of the Imagination, ſtruck by ſome great Idea, which makes things be conceiv'd, acted, and ſpoke in a more noble manner, than they wou'd otherwiſe have been;) ſhews that it enters almoſt every where into Buſineſs, as well as Pleaſure, into Fear, Love, and other Paſſions. Magnanimity, Heroic Virtue, Honour, Zeal, Religion and Superſtition are not exempt from it. Since all the Agitations of the Soul have their Exceſſes, there muſt be Moderation and Diſcretion us'd, to keep them in and guide them; otherwiſe *Enthuſiaſm* wou'd go too far.

The Author proves it by ſeveral Examples, and eſpecially by what is ſeen in religious Zeal, which occaſions the committing of very great Exceſſes, when it is not bridled and conducted by Reaſon. " In this Diſpoſition, *ſays he*, the " Reins are let looſe to all Paſſion that ariſes; " and the Mind, as far as it is able to act or " think in ſuch a State, approves the Riot, " and juſtifies the wild Effects, by the ſuppos'd

" Sacredneſs of the Cauſe. Every Dream and
" Frenzy is made *Inſpiration*; every Affection,
" Zeal. And in this Perſuaſion, the Zealots,
" no longer ſelf-govern'd, but ſet adrift to the
" wide Sea of Paſſion, can in one and the ſame
" Spirit of Devotion, exert the oppoſite Paſ-
" ſions of Love and Hatred; unite Affectio-
" nately, and abhor Furiouſly; curſe, bleſs,
" ſing, mourn, exult, tremble, careſs, aſſaſſi-
" nate, *inflict* and *ſuffer Martyrdom*, with a
" thouſaud other the moſt vehement Efforts of
" variable and contrary Affection."

The Author takes occaſion from hence, in few Words, to give the Hiſtory of the *Egyptian* Religion, and of the Power of their Prieſts. We know very well that nothing is more injurious to the *Polity*, or municipal Conſtitution of any City or Colony, than the forcing of a particular Trade: nothing more dangerous than the overpeopling any Manufacture, or multiplying the Traders, or Dealers, of whatever Vocation, beyond their natural Proportion, and the Publick Demand. Now it happen'd of old in *Egypt*, which may be call'd the Mother-Land of Superſtition, that the Sons of certain Artiſts were by Law oblig'd always to follow the ſame Calling with their Fathers. Thus the Son of a Prieſt was always a Prieſt by Birth, as was the whole Lineage after him, without interruption. Nor was it a Cuſtom with this Nation, as with others, to have only one ſingle Prieſt or Prieſteſs to a Temple, but what Number they pleas'd: and as the Number of Gods and Temples was infinite, ſo was that of the Prieſts. *Egypt* was divided into three Parts, and the Prieſts poſſeſt one Part from the Beginning, as *Diodorus Siculus* relates in the firſt Book of his *Bibliotheque*, whoſe Words the Author

thor cites, in Page 43. The Religious Foundations were without Reſtriction; and to one ſingle Worſhip or Temple, as many of the Holy Order might be Retainers, as cou'd raiſe a Maintenance from the Order.

Whatever happen'd to other Races or Profeſſions, that of the Prieſt, in all likelihood, muſt, by this Regulation, have propagated the moſt of any. 'Tis a tempting Circumſtance; to have ſo eaſy a Maſtery over the World; to ſubdue by Wit inſtead of Force; to practiſe on the Paſſions at will, and triumph over the Judgment of Mankind; to influence private Families and public Councils, conquer Conquerers, controul the Magiſtrate himſelf, and govern without the Envy which attends all other Government or Superiority. No wonder if ſuch a Profeſſion was apt to multiply, eſpecially when we conſider the eaſy Living and Security of the Profeſſors, their Exemption from all Labour and Hazard, the ſuppos'd Sacredneſs of their Character, and their free Poſſeſſion of Wealth, Grandure, Eſtates and Women.

There was no need to inveſt ſuch a Body as this, with rich Lands and ample Territories, as it happen'd in *Egypt*. The Generation or Tribe being once ſet apart as Sacred, wou'd, without further Encouragement, be able, no doubt, in proceſs of Time, to eſtabliſh themſelves a plentiful and growing Fund, or religious Land-Bank. 'Twas a ſufficient Donative, to have had only that ſingle privilege from the Law, That they might retain what they cou'd get; and that it might be lawful for their Order to receive ſuch Eſtates by voluntary Contribution, as cou'd never after be converted to other Uſes. 'Tis not difficult to imagine what their Growth wou'd be, and what Au-

thority

thority they wou'd have among the Superſtitious.

Beſides, their Climate, and their ſolitary Life, when ſhut up by the Inundations of the *Nile*; the unwholeſom Vapours ariſing from the new Mud, expos'd to the hot Sun; their various Meteors and *Phenomena*; with the long Vacancy they had to obſerve and comment on them; the neceſſity withal, which, on the account of their Navigation, and the Meaſure of their yearly drowned Lands, compel'd them to promote the Study of Aſtronomy and other Sciences, of which their Prieſthood cou'd make good Advantages; may all be reckon'd as additional Cauſes of the immenſe growth of Superſtition in *Egypt*.

'Twill, as I conceive, be found unqueſtionably true, according to *political Arithmetic*, in every Nation whatſoever; That the *Quantity of Superſtition* (if I may ſo ſpeak) will, in proportion, nearly anſwer the Number of Prieſts, Diviners, Soothſayers, Prophets, or ſuch who gain their Livelihood, or receive Advantages by officiating in religious Affairs. For if theſe Dealers are numerous, they will force a Trade. And as the liberal Hand of the Magiſtrate can eaſily raiſe Swarms of this Kind, where they are already but in a moderate proportion; ſo where, thro any other Cauſe, the Numbers of theſe are ſuffer'd to grow beyond meaſure, they will ſoon raiſe ſuch a Ferment in mens Minds, however ſenſible of the Grievance, as to be cautious in proceeding to a Reform.

The *Magi* of *Perſia* found themſelves ſtrong enough thereby, to render themſelves Maſters of the Crown, after the Death of *Cambyſes*: and ſomething like it happen'd in *Æthiopia*; whether the *Æthiopians* imitated the *Egyptians*, or the *Egyptians*, them. *Diodorus Siculus* in his

III. Book,

III. Book, tells us that in *Meroe*, which was the Metropolis of *Lower Æthiopia*, the Prieſts were ſo powerful, that, when they thought fit, they ſent word for the Kings to kill themſelves; and that no body dar'd to contradict what the Gods had commanded, by the Mouths of the Prieſts. A Serjeant, ſent by thoſe Men, ſhew'd the King a certain Sign; and ſo ſoon as he had ſeen it, he retir'd into a Houſe, where he kill'd himſelf: ſo much had *Paſſive-Obedience* taken root, among thoſe People. " During the pre-
" ceding Ages, *ſays the Hiſtorian*, the fooliſh
" Kings, without Conſtraint, neither by Force
" nor Arms, but bewitch'd by Superſtition
" only, obey'd the Prieſts: Till *Ergamenes*,
" King of *Æthiopia*, who was cotemporary
" with *Ptolomy* the Second, and who ſtudy'd
" Philoſophy and the Science of the *Greeks*, was
" the firſt that dar'd to contradict their Or-
" ders. Having taken the Courage which be-
" came a King, he went with Troops to an
" inacceſſible Place, where the Golden Temple
" of the *Æthiopians* was, kill'd all thoſe Prieſts;
" and having aboliſh'd that antient Cuſtom,
" reform'd Religion as he thought fit.

No Superſtition will ever be wanting among the Ignorant and Vulgar, whilſt the Able and Crafty have a Power to gain Inheritances and Poſſeſſions by working on human Weakneſs. This is a Fund, which, by theſe Allowances, will prove inexhauſtible. New Modes of Worſhip, new Miracles, new Heroes, Saints, Divinities (which ſerve as new Occaſions for ſacred Donatives) will be eaſily ſupply'd on the part of the Religious Orders; whilſt the Civil Magiſtrate authorizes accumulative Donations, and neither reſtrains the Number or Poſſeſſions of the Sacred Body.

Our

Our Author ſhews this more at large, and makes it appear that the *Hebrews*, by ſojourning in *Egypt*, grew fond of ſeveral *Egyptian* Cuſtoms; but we cannot dwell any longer thereon.

2. In the following Chapter, after he has reported the Judgment of ſome Divines concerning Enthuſiaſm, he makes ſome Reflections upon Scepticiſm; and relates, in his way, which is fine and agreeable, what paſs'd at *Epheſus*, in the Sedition which was rais'd upon account of St. *Paul* by the Craftſmen who made little Temples to *Diana*, as is related in *Chap.* 19. of the *Acts*. He pleaſantly ſays, that the Recorder, who appeas'd the Tumult, was apparently himſelf a *Diſſenter*, as the *Engliſh* phraſe it, or at leaſt an *Occaſional Conformiſt*; ſince he could anſwer ſo roundly for the new Sect, and warrant the *Church in Being* ſecure of *Damage*, and *out of all Danger* for the future.

He likewiſe makes appear, that good Humour and Wit may be of great uſe to ſtrengthen the true Religion; and that its Founders themſelves make uſe of theſe Arms for that reaſon. This has reſpect to the *Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm*, where he has maintain'd the ſame Poſition. This might be read here with pleaſure, but it is too long to be inſerted in this Extract.

Remark of the Author of Bibl. Choiſie.

It is certain, that a gentle ſedate Humour, free from Anger and Wrath, and even gay, provided this Gaiety breaks not the Rules of Decorum, is more proper to gain the Hearts and Minds of Men, than a ſour, chagrin, choleric and wrathful Humour; which is only fit, in my Opinion, to hinder others from minding what we have to ſay to them. The Greatneſs of Him whoſe Intereſts we eſpouſe, and the

Importance

Importance of what is propos'd on his behalf, require, I muſt confeſs, an Air of Serioufneſs. But this Diſpoſition ought not to be confounded with a ſullen and ſnappiſh Demeanor. This laſt Diſpoſition, capable of ſhocking every body, is an Effect of Humour, and not of the Part that is acted upon this Occaſion, or of the Thing it-ſelf which is in queſtion. If any one ſhould come on an Embaſſy, from an intractable Tyrant, and propoſe in his Name, things impoſſible, or unjuſt; then, to preſerve Decorum, he muſt come boiling with Wrath, and arm'd with Menaces and violent Speeches: but they who are Embaſſadors from Him who is Goodneſs it-ſelf, who puniſhes ſlowly and with regret, who is diſpos'd to do infinite good Actions to thoſe who will believe very rational things, and live in a manner very conformable to Reaſon, very uſeful to Society, and very advantageous to private Men that compoſe it, ſhou'd ſpeak with Mildneſs, and propoſe their Buſineſs in a peaceful manner, and rather gay than ſad. They had more need to pity Men, who ſeem oppoſite to it, than to put themſelves in a Paſſion againſt them; and if they can bring them to it, by ſhaming them out of their Folly, by mildly rallying them without Gall or Malice; they cannot, in my Opinion, be blam'd for it. On the other ſide, if they act in a quite contrary manner, and ſpeak with a diſturb'd Air, as if they were oblig'd to ſpeak for a capricious and implacable Maſter; if they exact a Belief of many contradictory Points, and require from Men, a manner of living almoſt impoſſible, and which wou'd ruin both the Society and its particular Members, if they were to follow it; if thereupon they threaten to inflict all the Puniſhments of this and a future Life, upon thoſe who are not diſpos'd to agree to what they ſay; if they carry themſelves

towards them with Exceſs, quarrel with them, anathematize rhem, take their Eſtate and Liberty from them, baniſh them, or kill them with cruel Tortures, ſending them to the Devil, by thoſe Puniſhments, as they believe, if they do not ſpeak againſt their Conſcience: If they carry themſelves, I ſay, in this manner, I don't know what they can have to ſay againſt the moſt violent Religions, ſuch as the *Mahometan*, and the like.

III. 1. Let this be ſaid, *en paſſant*: but to return to our Author, it is plain, that notwithſtanding the high Air of Scepticiſm which he took in the *Letter concerning Enthuſiaſm*, he is, at the bottom, a real *Dogmatiſt*. This he diſcovers in his *Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit*, which we have taken notice of, and in ſeveral Paſſages of his other Works.

Then he proceeds to the Riſe and Progreſs of the Sciences which came to us from the *Greeks* and *Latins*, and to what is call'd *a good Taſte*: Here he treats of the Manner of Writing, and ſearches into the Beginning of it in *England*. If the Reader, ſays he, were to examine the Speeches of our Anceſtors in Parliament, he will find them, generally ſpeaking, to have been very ſhort and plain, but coarſe, and what we properly call *home-ſpun*; till Learning came in vogue, and Science was known amongſt us. When our Princes and Senators became Scholars, according to the Faſhion of that time, they ſpoke ſcholaſtically; and the pedantick Stile was prevalent, from the firſt dawn of Letters, about the Age of the Reformation, till long afterwards. 'Twill undoubtedly be found, that till very late days, the Faſhion of ſpeaking and the turn of Wit was after the figurative and florid Manner, and that it is not long ſince we have come to the natural and ſimple Manner of Writing.

Upon

Upon this Occaſion, our Author makes ſeveral Remarks upon the Love of one's Country, and the Country it-ſelf, which deſerve to be read; but which are only the Preamble to the Leſſons, which he deſigns to give his Country-men upon a good Taſte.

2. He continues to treat of this Subject, in the following Chapter, where he ſhews of what importance it is, for Youth to form a good Taſte. All Nations are, in this reſpect, conceited, and commonly approve of nothing but what is eſteem'd in their own Country. But this muſt be underſtood of vulgar Wits, who have even leſs Extent than the Place they were born in. Our Author diſcovers and cenſures the Faults of his Countrymen, as well as thoſe of others; but he does it with Tenderneſs, that he might not draw the Croud upon his Back.

IV. 1. At the Beginning of the 4th *Miſcellany*, our Author obſerves, that the three Treatiſes, which are compris'd in the firſt Volume of that Edition, were a kind of Preparation to the 4th Treatiſe, where he inquires into the Nature of Virtue and Merit; and that the fifth, or *the Moraliſts*, is a kind of an oblique Apology for the preceding, which was at firſt printed from an imperfect Copy in 1699.

Afterwards the Author is introduc'd meditating, in a manner altogether metaphyſical, upon Himſelf; from whence, however, he draws Conſequences of Morality, upon the manner of regulating his Imagination, and fixing his Sentiments. All that he ſays ſhou'd be quoted, to make it underſtood, becauſe the Reaſoning is very cloſe.

2. After having made ſome Remarks upon the Sentiments of the Author of the preceding Volumes, touching the Tye there is among

the Particulars of the ſame Species, of which they are oblig'd, by Nature, to procure the Good; he from thence draws this Conſequence: " That ſince Man has been ſo conſtituted, by " means of his rational Part, as to be conſcious " of this his more immediate Relation to the u- " niverſal Syſtem, and Principle of Order and " Intelligence; he is not only by Nature ſociable, " within the Limits of his own Species, or Kind; " but in a yet more generous and extenſive man- " ner. He is not only born to Virtue, Friend- " ſhip, Honeſty and Faith, but to Religion, Pie- " ty, Adoration, and a generous Surrender of " his Mind to whatever happens from that Su- " preme Cauſe, or Order of Things, which he " firmly thinks to be abſolutely juſt, and perfect." Theſe are the ſerious Sentiments of the Author.

V. 1. In Chap. I. of the V. *Miſcellany*, the Author very well makes it out, that the Knowledg of Antiquity and Hiſtory is abſolutely neceſſary, for the defending and clearing up of the Chriſtian Religion. He has reaſon to blame *Gregory* the Great for having condemn'd the Study of the *Belles Lettres*, as well as the Patriarchs of *Conſtantinople*, if it be true that they have ſuppreſs'd ſeveral *Greek* Authors, as they are accus'd. I was very glad when I ſaw that the Author did not diſapprove of what I had ſaid thereupon, in Vol. XIV. of my *Bibliotheque Choiſie*, pag. 131, *&c.* which he cites in his pag. 241.

" 'Twou'd indeed be in vain, ſays he a little " lower, for us to bring a *Pontius Pilate* into " our *Creed*, and recite what happen'd under " him in *Judea*, if we knew not under whom " he himſelf govern'd, whoſe Authority he had, " or what Character he bore in that remote " Country, and amidſt a foreign People. In " the ſame manner, 'twou'd be in vain for a *Ro-*

" *man*

" *man* Pontiff to derive his Title to ſpiritual " Sovereignty from the Seat, Influence, Power " and Donation of the *Roman Cæſars*, and their " Succeſſors, if there appear'd not any Hiſtory " or collateral Teſtimony of it."

Thus it is not the Proteſtants only, that need the Knowledg of Antiquity, but likewiſe the *Roman* Catholics. The Author ſhews it more at large, with reſpect to the firſt. Indeed, Holy-Writ both of the Old and New Teſtament is full of Alluſions to the Hiſtory, Cuſtoms and Sentiments of the Pagans; of which it ſuppoſes a Knowledg in its Readers, and without which the Holy Books cannot be underſtood.

In ſpeaking of the Lights which we have drawn from the Antients, it came into the Author's Mind to advertiſe his Countrymen to regulate their Plays, according to the Rules which they have given us. At the ſame time, he points them out ſome Faults, which they are not, without Reaſon, reproach'd with.

2. He continues to criticize their Faults, and ſhews they are in the wrong to huff at that ſort of Cenſure, inſtead of profiting by it. I ſhall not dwell upon theſe Things, which are fitter for the *Engliſh* than thoſe of other Nations.

3. The laſt Chapter is not the leaſt of theſe *Miſcellanies*. The Author treats therein of the Right which Men have to think freely, and extend their Views; inſtead of ſhrinking their Minds, thro Fear and Weakneſs, as is commonly done. He proves, that from this narrowneſs of Spirit proceed ſeveral Vices, and that it hath alſo produced Bigotry. He ſhews the Agreement there is between Slavery and Superſtition; and on the other ſide the uſefulneſs of Liberty in Civil, Moral, and Spiritual matters. He proves that there have been excellent Divines, who

have

have been for Liberty of Thinking, ſuch as Biſhop *Taylor* and Archbiſhop *Tillotſon*; and that we ſhou'd not blindly ſubmit our-ſelves to all that the Divines ſay, under pretence that they are call'd *the Meſſengers of God*.

Laſtly, he introduces a Perſon, who ſhews that it is not poſſible to reduce all Men nor all Chriſtians to the ſame Sentiments; and that 'tis neceſſary for them to bear with one another, unleſs they will ſay that they who are the ſtrongeſt ſhou'd root out all the reſt.

I ſhall conclude, with tranſlating ſome Paſſages of this Chapter, which deſerve Attention, or which have ſomething remarkable in them.

Pag. 303. " It has been the main Scope, *ſays he*, and " principal End of theſe Volumes, to aſſert the " Reality of a Beauty and Charm in Moral as " well as Natural Subjects, and to demonſtrate " the Reaſonableneſs of a proportionate Taſte, " and determinate Choice in Life and Manners. " The Standard of this Kind, and the noted " Character of moral Truth appears ſo firmly " eſtabliſh'd in Nature it-ſelf, and ſo widely diſ- " play'd thro the intelligent World, that there " is no Genius, Mind, or thinking Principle " which is not conſcious of it. Even the moſt " refractory and obſtinate Underſtandings are by " certain Repriſes or Returns of Thought, on " every Occaſion, convinc'd of this Exiſtence, " and neceſſitated to acknowledg the *Right* and " *Wrong* of this Kind."

In ſpeaking of thoſe, who are againſt Liberty of Thinking, and the Uſe of Reaſon, he juſtly

Pag. 306. complains " that theſe Men do improperly con- " found Licentiouſneſs in Morals, with Liberty " in Thought and Action; and make the *Li-* " *bertine*, who has the leaſt maſtery of himſelf, " reſemble his direct oppoſite. For ſuch in-

" deed

" deed is the Man of reſolute Purpoſe and im-
" movable Adherence to Reaſon, againſt every
" thing that Paſſion, Prepoſſeſſion, Craft, or
" Faſhion can advance in favour of ought elſe.
" Seldom do theſe Expoſitors ever fail of bring-
" ing this ſort of Liberty into diſgrace. Even
" at the expence of Virtue, and of that very
" Idea of Goodneſs on which they build the My-
" ſteries of their profitable Science, they reverſe
" all Moral Philoſophy, refine on Selfiſhneſs,
" and explode Generoſity; promote a ſlaviſh
" Obedience in the room of voluntary Duty, and
" free Service; exalt blind Ignorance for Devo-
" tion, recommend low Thought, decry Reaſon,
" extol Voluptuouſneſs, Wilfulneſs, Vindicative-
" neſs, Arbitrarineſs, Vain-Glory, and even dei-
" fy thoſe weak Paſſions which are the Diſgrace
" rather than Ornaments of Human Nature."

After having ſpoke of the Title of *Embaſſador of Heaven*, which Men attribute a little too boldly to themſelves at this time, without being able to produce any Credentials from that Country, as the Apoſtles heretofore did; for their Miracles were, in effect, Credentials; he tells a Story, which deſerves to be read here in *French:*

" A certain *Indian*, *ſays he*, of the Train of the
" Embaſſador-Princes, ſent to us lately from
" ſome of thoſe Pagan Nations, being engag'd,
" one Sunday, in viſiting our Churches, and hap-
" pening to ask his Interpreter, *Who the eminent*
" *Perſons were that harangu'd ſo long, with ſuch*
" *Authority, from a high Place?* was anſwer'd,
" *they were Embaſſadors from the Almighty, or*
" (according to the *Indian* Language) *from the*
" *Sun*. Whether the *Indian* took this ſeriouſly
" or in Raillery, did not appear. But having
" afterwards call'd in, as he went along, at the
" Chappels of ſome of his Brother-Embaſſadors,

" of

" of the *Romiſh* Religion, and at ſome other
" Chriſtian Diſſenting Congregations, where
" Matters, as he perceiv'd, were tranſacted with
" greater Privacy, and inferior State; he ask'd,
" *Whether theſe alſo were Embaſſadors from the*
" *ſame Place.* He was anſwer'd, *That they had*
" *indeed been heretofore of the Embaſſy, and had*
" *Poſſeſſion of the ſame chief Places he had ſeen:*
" *But they were now ſucceeded there by others. If*
" *thoſe therefore,* reply'd the *Indian, were Embaſ-*
" *ſadors from the Sun; theſe I take for granted,*
" *are from the Moon.*

To conclude, the whole Work is writ with a great deal of Delicacy and Elegance, as whoever ſhall read it in the Original, will agree. It appears that the Author has well meditated his Subjects, and that he is Maſter of his Language. His general Aim being, as far as I can perceive, to eſtabliſh *Liberty* and *Virtue*, the two moſt valuable, moſt uſeful things, that Men can poſſeſs; his Deſign deſerves at leaſt, upon this account, to be applauded by all that equally hate *Slavery* and *Vice*, two things which deſerve the moſt to be abhor'd by Mankind.

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FINIS.